


AUGUST 1959



JOURNAL



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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Admiral Sir Charles E. Lambe, G.C.B., C.V.O., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex officio member on his appointment as First Sea Lord.

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Squadron Leader G. C. T. Richards, R.A.F.

PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

2nd Lieutenant R. W. S. Hall, R.A., and Pilot Officer R. J. Wilson, R.A.F., have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, have taken place:—

<i>Establishment or Command</i>		<i>Name</i>
Portsmouth Group, R.M.	...	Captain L. E. Beaton, R.M.
Eastern Command	...	Lieut.-Colonel J. S. S. Gratton.
Bomber Command	...	Wing Commander P. A. C. McDermott, D.F.C., D.F.M.
Coastal Command	...	Wing Commander A. M. J. Kent.
Flying Training Command	...	Wing Commander S. R. Hyland, O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C.
Maintenance Command	...	Wing Commander N. S. C. Chapman.
Far East Air Force	...	Wing Commander W. L. Farquharson, D.F.C.
Royal Air Force, Germany	...	Wing Commander R. S. Perry, D.F.C.

MUSEUM

ADDITIONS

A group of three medals awarded to Sergeant P. Sharcott, 24th Foot. Given by Mrs. C. Sharcott (9762).

A plate from the dinner service purported to have been used by Napoleon during his campaign against Russia, 1812. Given by Major R. Hill, a Member of the Institution, to commemorate his 85th birthday (9763).

* Life member

Three medals and a Canadian War Service Badge awarded to Sergeant H. A. Joy who was the son of Trumpet-Major Henry Joy, 17th Lancers, the bugler at the Charge of the Light Brigade, Balaclava, 1854. Given by Mrs. H. A. Joy, of Los Angeles (9764).

The Military General Service Medal, 1793-1814, with clasp "Maida," awarded to Robert Peel, 81st Foot. Given by Mrs. M. E. Wilson (9765).

LECTURES

The programme of lectures for the first half of the 1959-60 session, which would normally be published with this issue of the JOURNAL, was circulated with the May issue.

CHRISTMAS CARDS

Details of Christmas cards for 1959 were published as a foot-note to the lecture programme and are now repeated :—

Orders for Christmas cards, specially designed for members of the Institution, can now be placed.

Card A has the crest of the Institution on the outside, and inside a reproduction of a black and white sketch of Vanbrugh House in Whitehall Yard, the first home of the Institution. The price, including envelopes, is 12s. a dozen.

Card B is a reproduction in colour of an oil painting showing a view of the Tagus and Belem Castle with the Russian Fleet saluting the British Admiral's barge, c. 1808 ; inside is the crest of the Institution. The price including envelopes, is 20s. a dozen.

Postage and packing is 1s. for the first dozen and 6d. for each additional dozen by ordinary mail.

Members are requested to ensure that the correct remittance, including postage, is sent with their orders. *Orders cannot be executed until payment is made.*

Sample cards can only be sent against a remittance of 1s. 2d. for the A type and 1s. 10d. for the B.



**AN AEROBATIC DISPLAY BY HUNTERS
OF No. 111 SQUADRON**

THE JOURNAL

of the

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EDITOR'S NOTES

WE have to apologise not only for the reduced size of the present issue of the JOURNAL but also for the late distribution of the issue for May. Its final stages of production coincided with the beginning of the difficulties in the printing trade, and our JOURNAL was an early casualty. In order to try to catch up in time, this present issue is very much slimmer than usual, but we hope and expect to be back to normal in November.

It is not only to our readers that we must apologise for the smaller JOURNAL, but also to those officers and other distinguished writers whose articles have unavoidably been held over to a subsequent issue, when we shall be back to our usual number of pages. It is upon our authors that we rely to produce a worthwhile JOURNAL, and it is obviously something of a discouragement to contribute an article—usually topical—only to find it held over to a later publication. This is apt to become a cumulative process, but we shall hope to mitigate the evil effects by some temporary reductions in the volume of some of our permanent features. Thus readers will notice in this issue that the Service Notes are very much briefer than usual and that fewer books have been reviewed. A reduction has also been made in the Library accessions list at the end of the JOURNAL, only the most important of the new acquisitions being listed. We ask for indulgence for these economies in space, but needs must where the devil drives. We can only promise that these unhappy cuts will be restored as soon as conditions make it possible.

It only remains for the Editor to contribute his mite towards this enforced economy by cutting short his own notes at this stage.

THE ADAPTATION OF N.A.T.O. TO CHANGING WORLD CONDITIONS

By SIR FRANK ROBERTS, K.C.M.G., (United Kingdom
Permanent Representative, North Atlantic Council)

(On Friday, 20th February, 1959, at 1.30 p.m.)

REAR-ADMIRAL R. M. DICK, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : The duty and pleasure of the Chairman is to introduce the speaker at these meetings, and I think the further duty of the Chairman is to be as brief as possible. I should, however, like to make two points, if only for the fact that they are points which I have discussed with Lord Ismay, who would certainly have made them had he been here this afternoon, as he would have wished.

The first, I am sure, is known to many of you but perhaps it is worth recalling. It is to remind you that the N.A.T.O. countries in Paris have two Ambassadors. One is accredited in the ordinary way to the French Government and the other is accredited to N.A.T.O. The British Ambassador who is accredited to the North Atlantic Council is of course Sir Frank Roberts, and he has no post box job, as you can imagine. Not only does he have to present the view of his country, but also to listen to the discussions which take place between his colleagues who are members of the Council, and having obtained a consensus of their views, to present it to his own Government and, if he thinks it right, to suggest that a change of policy may be needed. Having had the privilege for some three years of sitting in on those discussions, I can assure you that it is a job which requires very special qualifications, and those qualifications, if I may say so, are particularly held by our speaker today.

First of all, he knows the Foreign Office inside out. He has been Principal Private Secretary, and Deputy Under-Secretary to the Secretary of State. He has wide diplomatic experience, which includes two years in Moscow and the post of Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He also has another useful attribute in that I understand he is bilingual in the two official N.A.T.O. languages, French and English.

Therefore I think you will agree that we can expect a talk which will be of considerable interest to us, particularly so at this moment, perhaps, because if the auguries of the last 24 hours are correct, there is little doubt that the Cyprus solution must do much to strengthen N.A.T.O. and to remove one of the very serious potential sources of discord.

I shall now ask Sir Frank Roberts to speak to us.

LECTURE

MAY I begin by thanking the Royal United Service Institution for giving a civilian this opportunity to talk about N.A.T.O. to what I assume to be mainly a Services audience.

You have had many remarkable lectures about N.A.T.O. here from Field-Marshal Montgomery. He has said, as well as done, much in support of N.A.T.O., but he has also followed the biblical precept of 'chastening those whom he loves.' You will not, I hope, expect from me, still a serving member of the N.A.T.O. Council, quite the same uninhibited personal approach to the problems of N.A.T.O. as that of the Field-Marshal, who was already a freelance last October.

Those of us who are in the N.A.T.O. ship and collectively responsible not only for its further progress but also for seeing that it remains afloat, know very well that there are many ways in which it can be improved. But we have to remember that every institutional or structural improvement requires the agreement of all

15 member countries and that major changes in the treaty itself would have to be referred to Parliaments as well as to Governments. Institutional changes are therefore extremely difficult, even if they were desirable.

Adaptation through evolution must be our goal. This is, after all, the traditional British approach.

It is as well to recall that N.A.T.O. was created to meet a certain need, has so far met that need, and is again in 1959 required to meet exactly the same need. This must be the background against which to review the way in which N.A.T.O. has also tried, not unsuccessfully, to meet other requirements within the limits of what 15 countries, with very different backgrounds and responsibilities, can be brought to accept as their common task.

In little more than a month N.A.T.O. will be celebrating in Washington the tenth anniversary of its foundation. What would normally have been, I suppose, an occasion for celebration will now probably be a very important business meeting to co-ordinate Western policies before a possible meeting with the Soviet Government, and in any case before we are faced with what might be a serious crisis in regard to Berlin, and access to it, at the end of May.

Those of us who were perhaps beginning to think that there was no real problem in Europe and that N.A.T.O. should look outside its boundaries to justify its continued existence, have been brought back sharply to the very real menace in the heart of Europe, and so to the root cause of N.A.T.O.

But my task today is stocktaking.

I am glad to be doing this here—a civilian among the Services—because one of N.A.T.O.'s main achievements—and it would be hard to overrate the debt it owes in this respect to its first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay—is to have brought soldiers and civilians, not of one but of 15 different nations, closer together discussing and trying to solve their common problems. There is closer inter-Service and inter-professional co-operation at S.H.A.P.E. and in the N.A.T.O. H.Q. at the Palais de Chaillot than there is in Washington or even in Whitehall.

It was once said that war was too serious a matter to be left to soldiers. I saw the other day a remark attributed to General de Gaulle, that politics today were much too serious to be left to the politicians. The N.A.T.O. view is that both should work together and N.A.T.O. has created the machinery for this.

I should like to remove any possible impression of complacency by directing your attention to the main criticism of N.A.T.O.

Its existence and the necessity for its continued existence are, I think, now largely taken for granted, which marks important progress. So the critics concentrate rather upon the inadequacies of N.A.T.O. We are told that it should be doing things which it is not doing: that it is too exclusively concerned with Europe; that it is ill-adapted to the global menace; that it is living in blinkers, failing to see the broad horizons; that it is doing nothing about the Soviet economic challenge in uncommitted countries; that it has failed to produce a single joint Western policy on which Western strategy could be based; and that it has not solved disputes nor ended rivalries between its members.

Those are the political criticisms.

There are also military criticisms relating to command structure, the streamlining of the military organization, the balance between nuclear and conventional weapons,

the balance between the Western military effort in Europe and in the rest of the world, and so forth.

But constructive criticism, which is healthy and useful as between allies concerned to make their common defence more effective and their political understanding closer, could become very misleading and dangerous if it gave the impression to the less-informed world outside—that N.A.T.O. was no good; that it was a sort of lowest common denominator of agreement based on easy compromises and lack of effort; and that in fact N.A.T.O. was no more likely to stand up to the strain than, say, the League of Nations before 1939.

The danger is particularly great in the case of N.A.T.O. because it rightly works in secrecy, whether on the military or the political side. There are no parliamentary debates and relatively little opportunity for press guidance, quite unlike a national Government.

Members of the N.A.T.O. Council can discuss problems frankly and seek compromises because they do not have to look over their shoulders to critics in their own countries, and because we are not operating in the full glare of publicity and looking for popularity.

This is, in my view, essential, but the price we pay is a certain lack of understanding in our own countries and the impossibility of defending ourselves against criticism, whether justified or not.

Nor do the critics always remember that the best is often the enemy of the good. N.A.T.O. is a good working alliance, and much the best available even if it is not in abstract terms the best conceivable blue print for defending all Western interests everywhere.

Could we now look a little more carefully into what N.A.T.O. was created to do and consider whether it has met that need?

Ten years is not so long a time, and I remember well the early days of N.A.T.O. I had been British Minister in Moscow from 1945 to 1947. I was Private Secretary to Ernest Bevin when he built up the Brussels Treaty, which led on, first, to the economic recovery of Europe through the Marshall Plan, and then to the military defence of Europe through N.A.T.O. I represented the United Kingdom at the talks in Moscow with Stalin and Molotov on the Berlin Blockade in 1948 before N.A.T.O. existed. And yet I often have to remind myself that the primary object of N.A.T.O. was not to cope with the so-called global menace, but to stop any further Soviet advance in Europe. This has been achieved, although the problem now faces us again in another form ten years later, and once again over Berlin.

The second requirement was to reverse the unilateral and rapid Anglo-American disarmament of 1945 by establishing a minimum of military defensive strength between the Western world and the Soviet *bloc*. Lord Montgomery began this with western European Union, Generals Eisenhower, Gruenther, and Norstad and many others have carried on the task and that minimum now exists, as it did not in 1949.

N.A.T.O. was, further, the essential political and military shield without which the amazing economic recovery of Western Europe could never have taken place, because there would have been no public confidence and no will to survive and to recover. This was all achieved by one essential means—the linking by treaty ties and in peacetime of Western Europe with the economic and military strength of the United States and Canada. Those two countries together provide today three-quarters of the military budgets of all 15 N.A.T.O. countries.

It was not one of the original goals of N.A.T.O. that Germany should be a member, although the use of German territory was and is essential to the deployment of Western defence forces. But it is in fact behind the N.A.T.O. shield that the whole movement towards the Franco-German reconciliation, the six-Power communities, and the growing unity of Western Europe—whose rivalries have so often led to world wars—that West Germany has not only become prosperous but has become anchored in the Western democratic world.

When therefore we compare the Berlin crisis of 1948 with that now facing us in 1959, we should realize that while there are many differences—some to our advantage and some, unfortunately, to the Soviet advantage—the main difference to our own advantage is the existence of N.A.T.O., which has provided a strong and confident public opinion in Western Europe, a strong democratic ally in Western Germany, and strong American and British troops already stationed in Germany in addition to the nuclear deterrent behind.

I have laid some emphasis upon this because it has been the fashion during most of my two years in N.A.T.O. to say that there was no real threat in Europe, that N.A.T.O. was pointed in the wrong direction, that it was a Maginot Line that could be turned, and that the threat was entirely outside the N.A.T.O. area. There have also been many suggestions that the Communists challenge is economic rather than military, and concentrated in the uncommitted nations.

In this country, in particular, it has often been suggested that conventional forces in Germany were rather a waste of effort and money.

But are these arguments, which sounded very attractive when the Communist threat was in Korea, or in the Middle East, or in Quemoy, quite so convincing today when the threat has returned so obviously to Berlin and to the centre of Europe? Would the 15 N.A.T.O. countries have rallied so firmly and so rapidly to the defence of Western rights in Berlin last December had we acted upon the various hypotheses I have mentioned, and weakened the N.A.T.O. base any further in Europe? Would we now be ready to stand our ground, or would Western Europe be scurrying in some disarray to get the best terms it could from a Russia no longer backward as in 1949 but likely to be soon an equal, or more-or-less equal, nuclear power with the United States?

I am not trying to argue—and nobody in N.A.T.O. would argue—that the Communist challenge is not global. We agree also that in the long run it is more economic than primarily military. But if we neglect the short run, the long run may have little interest for us in Europe.

Western Europe and North America together remain the essential base for the defence of all Western values, whether economic, ideological, or military. N.A.T.O. therefore provides the essential minimum concentration of military force without which there would be no possible Western defence.

We have all heard of Lenin's advice to Communists to reach Paris *via* Peking and Calcutta. This did not, however, express a Communist preference but a realistic appreciation of the relative ease at the time of the direct or the indirect advance.

The growing strength of N.A.T.O. in fact diverted Soviet pressure away from the N.A.T.O. shield, but the only way in which the Soviet Union could swiftly change the world balance of power to its advantage would be by neutralising, or

better still controlling, the economic strength and skills and the population of Western Europe. This could not be done anywhere else, not even in China or in India. It is therefore in Western Europe that the issue could be decided to our disadvantage at one stroke.

Overseas we can be weakened and eventually outflanked, but there we have time and opportunity to manoeuvre, and it is by no means probable that the uncommitted nations prefer Soviet to Western influence or will submit tamely to it. The first and direct business of N.A.T.O. is therefore with the Soviet threat in Europe, just as it was in 1949.

How are we meeting this threat ?

The main thing is our military posture. This is not perfect. SACEUR would I am sure like more divisions ; SACLANT more ships ; both more aircraft and missiles. The Western world could certainly provide them if the need were absolute, and absolutely understood.

But we are dealing with a threat which I think we are all agreed is very different from that of Hitler. Soviet Russia feels that time is on her side and that her ends can be achieved without war. She probes for weakness, but without committing herself beyond the point of no return. Therefore what is required on our side is a minimum forces concept, with enough troops on the ground to discourage infiltration or probes, and behind them enough nuclear strength and the means to deliver it to ensure that any serious Soviet attack would mean the destruction of Soviet strength at home.

We have to be careful to retain enough armed strength to defend Western interests outside Europe ; we must not endanger the economic recovery of Western Europe, which has put a halt to Communist progress, nor the capacity of North America and Western Europe to contribute to economic progress in the uncommitted world. Therefore N.A.T.O. has sought a reasonable balance between nuclear and conventional forces. We have not tried in peacetime to produce the forces in being and the expansive streamlined and integrated command structures which would be required if we were concerned with fighting a major war in the near future rather than with deterrence.

This is the decision which each individual N.A.T.O. country has made for itself, as a calculated risk. It must therefore also be the collective decision of N.A.T.O., as the sum of its parts.

This sword-shield concept of N.A.T.O., and above all the unity of its members, have given confidence within the alliance, as recent events have proved, and have also given pause to any potential aggressor.

The command structure in an alliance has of course to take account of national susceptibilities and political difficulties. Military headquarters may seem big, but do not forget that co-operation in them is the best contribution to the strategic education of member-countries. The effects of this are already seen throughout the alliance.

N.A.T.O. does ensure the unity of 15 allies in peace and the use of their territory in a common defence system, at the price of some loss of the efficiency normal in a single national unit. This has been achieved without interfering with the national character and command in peace of the individual forces, a point on which, for example, General de Gaulle insists.

Of course, integration could, should, and no doubt will go further. Much progress has been made towards the integration of the air defence of Europe, thanks to the major decision taken to this end by the United Kingdom and almost all our allies, but we still lag behind what has been done on the North American continent. An effective integrated early warning system, with its forward scatter communications and radar, now exists and is being constantly improved. Since it extends as widely as Norway and Turkey and Iceland, it is obvious that it could never have been constructed, or financed, except through N.A.T.O., with its planning and financing in common.

Good progress has also been made towards the introduction into N.A.T.O. forces of intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear stockpiles, in accordance with the decision of the Heads of Government in December, 1957.

Only the common infrastructure planning and financing of N.A.T.O. permits these relatively expensive installations wherever they may be required, just as it has made possible the building and dispersal of the airfields essential to present N.A.T.O. strength.

It is unfortunate that more has not been done to translate the principle of interdependence into practical terms in the co-ordinated production of weapons, especially modern ones, and of balanced forces. National rivalries and vested industrial interests have been very hard to overcome, and this is the field in which least progress has been made.

United Kingdom force reductions, the continued presence of the bulk of French forces in North Africa, the reduction of the period of military service in several countries, e.g. Germany, Belgium, and Denmark, all these have disturbed N.A.T.O. But the United Kingdom financial agreement with Germany (negotiated through and signed in N.A.T.O.), and better United Kingdom recruiting figures have done much to stabilize the United Kingdom position in N.A.T.O.; General de Gaulle has better prospects than previous French Governments of achieving some settlement in Algeria; and the German forces, after some initial delays, are now growing fast and will soon transform the defence posture of N.A.T.O.

In command, improvements will no doubt be made, for example in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic.

But such changes are not simple.

In the Baltic there are clearly psychological problems in peace-time for a country like Denmark in deciding whether to look primarily south towards Germany or to Norway in the north. In the Mediterranean, natural French concern with control over north-south communications (the Paris—Algiers—Tamanrasset axis extending west to Dakar) conflicts with the normal east-west axis of other, and especially British, sea communications through the Mediterranean. Finally, there has been the suggestion that the highest military authority in the alliance—the Standing Group—should be with the Council in Europe rather than in America, and, coupled with this, that it should devote itself more to global and not only to N.A.T.O. strategy.

Here there seems to many of us in N.A.T.O. to be some misunderstanding. The main military strength of N.A.T.O. comes from North America. It is therefore surely more important that the Standing Group should be in day-to-day contact with the Pentagon than with the North Atlantic Council.

Global strategy is also the job of a world power like the United States, and, to a lesser extent, of the United Kingdom and France, rather than of a regional alliance like N.A.T.O.

The interests of S.E.A.T.O., the Baghdad Pact, the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States, and the problems of Africa must also be considered. But N.A.T.O. is not the right organization for this wider task.

To sum up, on the military side, N.A.T.O. has provided, and can continue to provide, a sufficient military strength to support Western diplomacy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, a very unusual position for democracies in peace-time. Further, the N.A.T.O. alliance provides the scattered and widespread front at sea and on land essential for our defence system based on the deterrent. When you add to this the habit of frank and friendly co-operation which has grown up among the soldiers of the alliance, these are, I think, very genuine military strengths to be set against admitted shortcomings, all of which stem from the fact that N.A.T.O., is an alliance of 15 independent countries, not a supranational organization nor a group of satellites directed by one, two, or even three of their bigger brethren. So much for the *military side in broad outline*.

On the *political side*, the N.A.T.O. Council has always operated well when dealing with its direct traditional task of ensuring Western security *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. The work has increased over the past two years, with the prospect of important negotiations and with developments in Western thinking.

All Western positions relating to negotiations with the Soviet Union, preparations for Summit or Foreign Ministers' meetings, negotiations on Germany or Berlin, the problems of disengagement and protection against surprise attack, the cessation of nuclear tests, or the Rapacki Plan—all these and many other basic defence questions have always been thrashed out in the North Atlantic Council. Whatever the differences between individual countries on other issues—and they do of course exist—on all these questions the Council at once comes to attention, as it were, and deals rapidly, efficiently, and expeditiously with the common business. Although we do not aim higher than co-ordination, one could reasonably speak of a joint Western policy in most of these fields.

Now what about the world outside the N.A.T.O. boundaries and the global menace which is of such close concern to our own country and which would probably have been the main theme of my talk had I been speaking to you last autumn? Here there is, I think, much confusion, which I should like to try to clarify, about N.A.T.O.'s functions.

The N.A.T.O. Treaty is very definite; its obligations are precise and limited to the area of the 15 countries, including certain islands in the Mediterranean but not Cyprus, and the Algerian Departments of France but not Morocco or Tunis. Any threat to or attack on these specified territories brings the whole alliance into operation.

It might be convenient for countries with world-wide interests like the United Kingdom, the United States, or France if N.A.T.O. obligations were also world-wide. But the smaller countries of N.A.T.O. have already assumed commitments which are for them revolutionary. The problems of some member countries are not very close to the hearts or minds of the others. They become so gradually through the educative processes of consultation and co-ordination in N.A.T.O.

As against this the United States, with its very divergent responsibilities in different areas, could not accept that its policies, say, in South-East Asia or in Africa, should necessarily be dependent upon the unanimous approval of its N.A.T.O. allies, many of whom have no such responsibilities. Nor would the United Kingdom be very happy over such a prospect. Therefore a single N.A.T.O. policy towards the problems of the outside world is not possible. Nor would it be desirable.

The uncommitted countries, who form the great majority in the debated areas of Asia and Africa, have too recently freed themselves, as they see it, from European rule to accept anything which looked like collective European tutelage through, for example, even the most cautious N.A.T.O. concern with their affairs. A common N.A.T.O. policy towards them would be intolerable.

These are the facts of international life, whatever we may think about them. So we should not aim too high.

It is enough and by no means easy to ensure that N.A.T.O. should have a common, a joint, or a co-ordinated policy on a stated problem of direct concern to the 15 N.A.T.O. countries, e.g., disengagement or surprise attack in Europe. The responsibilities and the opportunities of the individual N.A.T.O. countries in the rest of the world differ, and it is better that each should operate in its own way according to its special possibilities. What N.A.T.O. can and does do in this field is to ensure the exchange of essential information, which in its turn may result in practice in some degree of co-ordination between policies, which may be all the more effective because they are not identical. Harmony and not unison is the goal, and co-ordination through consultation is the means to attain it.

When we succeed, no-one hears of it and the harmony is taken for granted. When N.A.T.O. countries clash, it is often because no attempt has been made in N.A.T.O. to co-ordinate action and policy in advance or at least to exchange views.

This is what N.A.T.O. has been doing increasingly over the past two years; when I came to N.A.T.O. two years ago it would have been considered rather odd to have discussed Middle Eastern questions, even those of the closest concern to members of the alliance.

All this has changed. There is now the beginning of some contact, very discreet it is true, between N.A.T.O. and other regional organizations—the Baghdad Pact, S.E.A.T.O., and the Organization of American States. The N.A.T.O. countries review in the Council major developments in such areas as the Middle East, where they all have major interests, if only over the supply of oil.

To take an obvious example—the United Kingdom and the United States had given their allies in N.A.T.O. a full picture last summer of the position and of possible developments in the Middle East. They had indicated the kind of action they would have to take in certain circumstances to defend the independence of friendly countries, if asked by them to do so. When those circumstances arose unexpectedly and the United States and the United Kingdom had to act at short notice in the Lebanon and in Jordan, no-one in N.A.T.O. could have been surprised, and there was none of the bitterness and frustration which followed the Suez crisis, where no such advance consultation had taken place.

At this point some may say that N.A.T.O. should not even be paddling in these distant ponds when waters nearer home are muddy or disturbed. Surely, before looking at the outside world, N.A.T.O. should deal with its own internal differences.

My first comment would be that the British Commonwealth does not aim so high, and is usually careful to leave disputes between its members for solution elsewhere, e.g. in the United Nations. N.A.T.O. however has, within the last two years, encouraged its Secretary-General to act as a conciliator. This is only possible because N.A.T.O. works without publicity. This enables the Secretary-General and individual Permanent Representatives to work for solutions without having to strike public attitudes which might be popular in our individual countries.

The two main internal disputes which have worried the Council over the past two years have been Iceland and Cyprus.

N.A.T.O. has not solved either, but in the case of the Icelandic fishing limits, alternative practical solutions were worked out in N.A.T.O. last summer which would have met the situation had N.A.T.O. been competent to solve a juridical issue between the United Kingdom and Iceland. Unfortunately, N.A.T.O. is not a court of law and no substitute for the International Court of Justice.

Cyprus has imposed an even more serious strain because of the threat to the exposed east flank of N.A.T.O. It was however in N.A.T.O., with the great help of Spaak, that discussions took place which all but led to a conference last autumn and which, in my view, would have led to such a conference had there not been the alternative of reference to the United Nations a month later. It was the N.A.T.O. discussions which did much to take the heat out of the subsequent United Nations debate, thus permitting Greek-Turkish conversation which would not long ago have seemed inconceivable. These began in Paris at the December N.A.T.O. Ministerial Meeting and we can now see the result.

I am personally convinced that the reconciliation of United Kingdom, Greek, and Turkish interests would have been very difficult to achieve at this late stage without N.A.T.O.

I should mention briefly N.A.T.O.'s new role in the field of science. We now have a Science Adviser, and a high-powered Science Committee composed of leading scientists from each of our countries meeting in Paris at stated intervals.

And I must say a word about N.A.T.O.'s role in the economic field. Article 2 gives N.A.T.O. the general task of trying to co-ordinate the economic policies of its members. In practice, of course, this has been done in the O.E.E.C. and other specialized organizations.

It has been suggested that N.A.T.O. should do more about the Soviet and Chinese economic challenge to Western interests in under-developed nations. Here again we are on very dangerous ground. Western aid to under-developed nations—for example, United Kingdom aid to the Commonwealth and Colonies—does not necessarily have anything to do with the Soviet menace or with N.A.T.O. It began before either were thought of, and would be carried on in our general policies of Commonwealth and colonial development or in United States and United Nations aid programmes.

It would be wrong and dangerous if N.A.T.O. action in this field should encourage the idea that Western economic interest in the under-developed world was restricted to counter-action against the Soviet Union. Since the uncommitted world is by definition determined to avoid too close association with either the Soviet-Chinese or the Western blocs, anything with a N.A.T.O. label would be automatically suspect or even rejected. N.A.T.O. can however, through its Economic Committee, act as a sorting-house for the exchange of information among the 15 nations.

To conclude, I hope I have said enough to suggest that N.A.T.O. is not hidebound. It is not old enough to have found satisfactory solutions to all its problems but it is young enough to be seeking them with an open mind.

On the political side, the basic concepts are, (i) co-ordination of policies through consultation, and, (ii) for disputes, within the alliance, conciliation behind the scenes through the Secretary-General. Encouraging progress has been made in both respects.

In the military field, the basic task now is to introduce modern weapons into the common defence while preserving a sufficient conventional strength, both in Europe and overseas, and without overstraining the economies of the different member-countries.

In the years ahead the alliance will no doubt modify its political and military structure. But there are three basic requirements which must not be overlooked. First comes the maintenance of effective military and political ties between Western Europe and the North American Continent, the two sections of the Atlantic Community. This now, and for a period as far ahead as we can foresee, means the presence of United States, Canadian, and United Kingdom troops on the mainland of Europe. Secondly, comes the continued co-operation of a democratic Germany with the other democracies of Western Europe. This means constant and careful re-assessment of the problems of German re-unification and of Berlin of the kind in which we are now engaged. The third is to maintain the continued co-operation and confidence of the smaller N.A.T.O. countries which are collectively, as well as individually, vital to the alliance.

Without this we should lose what is as important an element of the Western deterrent as nuclear retaliatory weapons or the conventional shield forces; that is, the will power of Western populations to face up to Soviet threats without undue anxiety.

We shall only eventually develop a real Atlantic community if we avoid at this stage putting undue strains upon what remains an alliance in which each country has separate as well as common interests. We shall only maintain an effective base for the defence of the Western world if N.A.T.O. carries out its primary tasks in Europe and North America without attempting to turn itself or any of its members into a sort of world directorate handling collectively all global, military, and political problems.

Most international organizations in history have failed because they have set their sights too high and because their inevitable failures have discredited them with public opinion. N.A.T.O. can continue to deserve and retain the confidence of its member-countries if it concentrates on its main functions, developing and extending them prudently within the limits of what is possible for 15 allied governments. But evolution must be the method of adaptation within N.A.T.O.; and conciliation, consultation, and co-ordination must remain the watchwords of the Council.

DISCUSSION

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR POWER: What would be the procedure if Israel wanted to join N.A.T.O.?

THE LECTURER: The Treaty lays down that any State which fulfils certain democratic principles can be accepted as a member of the alliance, but of course this requires the agreement of all 15 countries, first the governments and eventually Parliaments. When Greece and Turkey joined, it was necessary to go through all those procedures. It

meant also in the case of Greece and Turkey a prolongation of the actual geographical limitations of the alliance. The original 1949 Treaty laid down certain geographical limits, which were extended to cover Greece and Turkey and which excluded Cyprus, and whether Israel falls within that I do not know. Your question referred to procedure and my answer refers only to procedure.

REAR-ADMIRAL A. D. NICHOLL : Could the lecturer say something about the way in which good feeling in nations has progressed? We all know that it has progressed in S.H.A.P.E. and N.A.T.O., but when I was in Norway last summer I was asked to a dinner to meet a German admiral. The Norwegians, however, would not come to the dinner, so the admiral said that he would not come either. Therefore, I had a very nice dinner but there were no others there! Has that position improved? One realizes of course the awful memories which they must have in these countries.

THE LECTURER : It is extremely hard for me to give an authoritative reply because I live in Paris. I get information, but I do not know exactly what is happening elsewhere. I should have thought it was progressing fairly well. A major problem was I suppose that concerning the Germans and the French, but that has fortunately progressed to such an extent that Franco-German amity and concord can at times be almost embarrassing!

Germany has only been a member of N.A.T.O. since 1955, and very considerable progress has been made. In fact, the general view is that Germany is not playing quite a big enough part in N.A.T.O., but the difficulty is that all N.A.T.O. posts, military and civilian, were shared out before Germany became a member. We want to bring her in more and more and wish her to have a bigger proportion of the senior posts, but one difficulty is for Germany to make the people available.

I would claim that the existence of N.A.T.O. helps to promote amity and concord between the members. Inevitably the process is quicker at headquarters than in the countries.

COMMANDER H. H. MULLENEUX : Looking a long way ahead, does the lecturer see any signs of N.A.T.O. becoming a supranational organization? There is a great deal of talk about the Atlantic Community but no real machinery for it.

THE LECTURER : The reply I give must be personal, but it is no, I do not, in any future we can reasonably foresee. The main member of N.A.T.O. is the United States, and the United States does not join supranational organizations. Another important member of N.A.T.O. is the United Kingdom, which is a member of the Commonwealth and is not prepared to join the six-Power European Community because it is a supranational body, so unless we change we would presumably be opposed to N.A.T.O. being supranational. Therefore, the chances are slight and, in any case, I would hope that we should not aim at that but stay with what we have already, which is a very good alliance.

COLONEL J. MACNAIR-SMITH : The lecturer mentioned countries outside the N.A.T.O. alliance. I should like to ask him why Spain is not part of the alliance. I understand that the United States have an arrangement for air bases in Spain. Is it on account of the prejudice that seems to exist in many quarters against the present Spanish Government that Spain is not a member of the alliance? It is a country of obviously great strategic importance.

THE LECTURER : In 1949, when N.A.T.O. was created, I do not think that Spain's relations with most of the members of N.A.T.O. were particularly good—certainly not as good as they are today. There is an ideological difficulty. After all, many of the member countries of N.A.T.O. have Labour Governments today which are not particularly in sympathy with the régime in Spain. Spain has never actually applied to join. There are definite rules of the 'club,' as it were, in regard to the particular régime of the country concerned. I am not criticizing or defending, but there are Western democratic countries who may think that the Spanish régime does not correspond to those rules, and if the issue were raised, there might be a debate which might not be to the advantage of N.A.T.O. or Spain. The problem however has not arisen.

As regards the strategic point you raised, there is an agreement between Spain and the United States.

COMMANDER L. E. PEYTON-JONES : On the question of interdependence, it seems to me that no nation will really accept it save as a last resort to balance its budget. Although lip service may be paid to it, I am not sure that any nation can honestly say that it wholeheartedly subscribes to it. It seems, for instance, that France's recent decision to have her own thermo-nuclear weapons strikes at the very root of this concept. Does the lecturer see any hope of any real progress in this field ?

THE LECTURER : I think you can regard interdependence either from the top—thermo-nuclear weapons—or down to jeeps. In the first period of N.A.T.O. the attempt of course was to try and rationalize the production and supply of conventional weapons—jeeps, rifles, and so on—and those efforts met with some success though not much, because they came up against the fact that each country had its own source of supply. The hope was, and still is, that now we are coming into a quite different field, the field of missiles and things of that kind which most countries do not as yet possess, that we can start anew, as it were. The major manufacturing countries of Europe have tried to do something on those lines.

The methods are rather new and not by any means fruitless or hopeless, but there are difficulties. For example, there are the European countries in the six-Power Community which are considering this in terms of their own manufacturing capacity, whereas we in the United Kingdom have gone further ahead and have actual prototype weapons ready. Therefore, we tend to appear to be wanting other people to buy our things. It would be excellent if we could find a solution and have an agreed joint scheme for one major missile within a year. But I do not want to leave you with the impression that things are hopeless or that we can take it that there will be no effective interdependence. It is too soon and discussions are still going on.

BRIGADIER GEORGE TAYLOR : I think the lecturer said that we were approaching a state of nuclear parity. It seems to me that it might be desirable for the European N.A.T.O. Powers to build up in Europe auxiliary forces on the lines of the Swiss militia or British Home Guard to strengthen our military position economically.

THE LECTURER : I am no authority on how to raise armed forces or train them, and it would be silly for me to comment on this. To take two main countries in Europe, Germany and France, the Germans are at present employed in building up their armed forces and anything which delayed that would be a pity. In the case of France, there is a completely new organization of the French defence which was published a few days ago. It seemed at first sight to take into account the principle of forces mobilized in that way.

MR. T. H. PRESTON : I should like to ask what is the policy of N.A.T.O. as regards psychological warfare, particularly in view of the enormous sums spent by the Russians on psychological warfare or propaganda. How much is being spent by N.A.T.O. on that, and is the expenditure likely to be increased ?

THE LECTURER : There are two views on this. One view, which is perhaps held more in the international secretariat of N.A.T.O. is that N.A.T.O. should be doing more about this, and that national governments should give it more money with which to do it. The other view is that national governments are better equipped than N.A.T.O. headquarters to do this kind of work, and that the money which their taxpayers can be persuaded to vote for this purpose can be better spent by individual nations. I think that on the whole the truth lies somewhere in between. I think that in the case of our own country, which has devoted some effort towards this, it would be a mistake to divert the effort we are already making, which is still insufficient, into an international channel. I think that would be even more true of the United States.

When one comes to some of the smaller countries of N.A.T.O. it is difficult, because they have not the same means to do this on their own, so there I think it is necessary to pool knowledge and to prepare what is being done in the different countries.

When you come to the next stage, that is, having compared your knowledge and information and pooled it—there are frequent meetings of the heads of information services of N.A.T.O.—the problem still arises how shall we do it? Is it best to give the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. say an additional £10,000,000 for this purpose, or for individual countries to step up their individual efforts? On the whole my preference would be for individual countries which inevitably have far bigger staffs and more experts, rather than setting up some great new organization. But there are different views and there is room for some compromise.

GROUP CAPTAIN S. O. TUDOR: Is not the whole trouble with the organization that individual countries are unwilling to put up funds for the provision of weapons which contribute to general N.A.T.O. defence, but are only looking to their own local defence measures?

THE LECTURER: No, that is not quite fair, because after all the defence of N.A.T.O. is provided by the sum of the individual efforts. The Standing Group in Washington is one body which is always discussing this, and in the last resort the individual country has to decide. We could take that decision alone, but we discuss it fully with our allies. There is full and complete discussion in advance, and the results are not as bad as some people think.

GROUP CAPTAIN S. O. TUDOR: I think it is necessary to educate the smaller nations as to what is the general picture of N.A.T.O. defence, and this includes psychological warfare.

THE LECTURER: I agree, but that is exactly what N.A.T.O. does. One must not talk only of the smaller nations. Last year they wanted to educate the United Kingdom. They do not agree that everything we do is right, and for a year the 'education' went on and it was successful, because we modified our views to some extent. That is what happens in the general process of consultation. It is very hard round a Council table to go on month after month opposing a growing volume of pressure from 14 others. We have to go along as best we can, and progress is not always as fast as we should like.

SQUADRON LEADER D. J. GORDON: A large proportion of France's military effort has been committed in North Africa. If a settlement were achieved there, would the forces so released be a contribution to N.A.T.O.?

THE LECTURER: France is called upon in the N.A.T.O. plan to support a certain contribution of X divisions. At the moment she is much short of the number X because, quite correctly—and it is provided for—she has an overseas emergency and needs troops overseas. She has an army of something like 400,000 in Algiers. I do not think we should want 400,000 men suddenly put down in Germany; but what we would expect is that enough troops would be put in Germany to come up to the X divisions required of France. I suppose the remainder would be demobilized.

CAPTAIN E. HINTERHOFF: A few months ago in a lecture to this Institution, Viscount Montgomery propounded an idea of a superstructure in the form of a political organization consisting of three great Powers with overseas interests. That was opposed by Germany and Italy, and I should like to know whether this idea has been dropped and, if so, why?

THE LECTURER: I would suggest that that idea, whether good or bad, should not be regarded as an idea for N.A.T.O. N.A.T.O. is a regional alliance with certain heavy responsibilities. It is not, and could not be, a world alliance. Whether it is useful to have some political organization for these three countries dealing with problems outside N.A.T.O. is another matter. What would not be acceptable would be to have such a Political Standing Group inside the N.A.T.O. Council.

LIEUTENANT M. LEES: In the eventuality of German reunification, how would the position of West Germany in N.A.T.O. be affected; and in European politics which takes precedence, a united Germany or a strong N.A.T.O.?

THE LECTURER : In view of the talks now going on, I think it would be very rash of me to try to make an authoritative pronouncement on that question. The territory of the German Federal Republic is essential for the deployment of Western defence as we now see it, and I suggest that is likely to be so for some time to come.

MAJOR JOHN NORTH : We hear that the present intention of Soviet policy is to disrupt what would appear to be a reasonably stable situation in Europe. Is that intention actuated by fear or with a view to ideological conquest ?

THE LECTURER : I would have thought both. Surely Russia has never given up the idea of extending her influence in Europe to Western Germany, but at the moment she cannot have much hope of doing that quickly. If you put the two together now, it would presumably be Western Germany which would influence Eastern Germany. I should have thought that one of Russia's major goals would be to get American positions as far as possible away from her territory. May be that will change in the world of inter-continental ballistic missiles.

The Russian position as far as Eastern Europe is concerned is perhaps the most difficult of all Russian positions in the world. She has plenty of opportunities in the Middle East and Asia, but in Eastern Europe she has some awkward responsibilities and does not feel too happy about them. She presumably does not like to see too strong an organization next door.

SQUADRON LEADER D. HEALY : With regard to the situation which is developing in Berlin, we hear American statements about what action they would contemplate in certain circumstances. How far have such statements got the backing of N.A.T.O., or are they divorced from it ?

THE LECTURER : The statements which have the backing of N.A.T.O. are the Four-Power communiqués, such as the communiqué of last December which stated that we should not allow ourselves to be deprived of our rights in Berlin or our rights of access to it. That is the official position. In other words, all the 15 N.A.T.O. countries are pledged to support the three Western Powers in Berlin in defence of West Berlin, and to retain the right of access.

GROUP CAPTAIN S. O. TUDOR : The Russians have an advantage in being able to dictate to their satellite nations by using threats of force, whereas N.A.T.O. can only recommend to its constituent members what they should do. Are we getting closer to unified direction and command ?

THE LECTURER : Each national element of N.A.T.O. is under national command. What S.H.A.P.E. does is to carry out planning and to co-ordinate training and to move in fields where one country on its own could not do anything effective, such as setting up a radar chain. There never has been any suggestion that the Supreme Commander in Europe should in peacetime have those rights of command over all armies under his command. If it were suggested I can think of one country which would object, which is France, and I think that the United Kingdom might also.

SQUADRON LEADER G. R. MOORE : The lecturer spoke of conventional forces in N.A.T.O. and the nuclear deterrent. Is there any planning within N.A.T.O. for the use of tactical atomic weapons, to determine what is a tactical weapon, what constitutes a tactical target, and whether tactical weapons could be used without initiating a full-scale thermo-nuclear war.

THE LECTURER : I think that General Norstadt has a fairly good idea of these various possibilities, but I think that he would be surprised if in public I said exactly what it was !

THE CHAIRMAN : I think that we have had a good question time and Sir Frank has dealt with the points speedily and clearly. Having started off by saying he was here as a civilian, he has answered a number of highly military questions with an accuracy and knowledge which I for one very much admired.

I should like only to make two points in closing this meeting. One is perhaps to stress, particularly as we are in this Institution which discusses military matters, an

important aspect of the building up of N.A.T.O. which is apt not to receive enough attention. Sir Frank talked about nuclear weapons and the establishment of radar chains. These things have been built up, but I think that one of the most important needs which has been met and which is so apt to be forgotten in terms of time is the building up of communications and command. You can clothe the skeleton with flesh relatively quickly, but the building of the military skeleton is something which takes a great deal of time and a great deal of thought. That is never more so than in an alliance such as ours in peacetime.

The second point is that I was struck by the thought of how apt we are to forget when we complain about N.A.T.O. that we are comparing free allies as against satellites. That runs right through the whole business. The other side is a dictatorial organization with satellites, whereas N.A.T.O. is faced with the far more complex task of pulling everybody along. However, once that link is firmly established—as I believe it is—then it is of course far stronger, and will stand up far better to the stress of time than any form of satellite organization.

It only remains for me now to thank Sir Frank Roberts on your behalf. There is no use or value in an effort on my part to sum up this widely ranging lecture which, at the same time, was so extremely closely knit. We are very fortunate to have had such an up-to-date and clear summary of a vast subject presented so skilfully and in so short a time. (*Applause.*)

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR POWER: I hope you will join me in thanking Admiral Dick for having taken the chair today. We all know of his expert knowledge and experience, and failing Lord Ismay we could not have had a better Chairman. (*Applause.*)

LIMITED WAR—BRUTE FORCE OR SUBTLE PRESSURE ?

BY GROUP CAPTAIN E. A. WHITELEY, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F. (RETD.)

THE key to overall security is, first, the deterrence of limited aggression and then, if deterrence fails, the ability to use our military forces effectively without provoking a global or near global conflict. The second requirement is a particularly difficult one because, without the use of some nuclear weapons, the West appears to be inferior in military strength to the Communists. This article is to suggest military methods and diplomatic policies which, with suitable development and refinement, may help to solve the problem. Its theme is the application of subtle pressure by a new range of military operations in which blast and fire from bomb, shell, or missile are not regarded as the only methods of military persuasion.



OUR AIM

The methods we use in war must be directly related to our aim. Our aim in any future international dispute is assumed to be limited and our attitude reasonably compromising. In general terms, we should seek to change the temper of the enemy and their leaders so that their behaviour towards us becomes more acceptable. The pressure which is applied—military and political—should be designed to convince our adversaries that the investment of further effort in the struggle is not worthwhile when account is taken of the alternative course(s) open to them. We must create as quickly as possible a climate of opinion in the enemy country which questions the need for the external adventure or policies which provoked the conflict and which is amenable to a truce and a settlement on reasonable terms.

TRADITIONAL SUGGESTIONS FOR LIMITING WAR

Various codes of military action have been suggested to avoid spreading the war, e.g. we should restrict the depth to which our forces are allowed to operate, we should attack only military targets, we should use only conventional or low power nuclear weapons. Some of these policies undoubtedly have application in the right circumstances, but they often involve serious disadvantages which could jeopardize or delay achieving our aim unless we can do something else at the same time.

While it is easier to negotiate successfully when our adversary has 'bloodied his nose,' containment or an initial defeat of the enemy forces in the area of aggression may not be sufficient in itself; in fact this result may easily lead to involvement of additional enemy forces withdrawn from other theatres, or to the introduction of nastier weapons, or to military action against us elsewhere. In other words, too much military success on the initial front may provoke a widening of the conflict or intensification of hostilities. The military force potentially against us in any situation might be described as a non-finite variable.

Apart from these considerations, the various operational restrictions imposed for political reasons may prevent our armed forces from achieving decisive military superiority in the tactical area.

PROPOSED MILITARY OBJECTIVES

What we really need is pressure not only on the military forces but also on the people who govern or could lead the enemy nation to induce them to have second thoughts on the whole situation. How can we apply pressure directly on the hostile Government and influential enemy groups (as distinct from their military commanders in the front line) and in a way which will not outrage world opinion or justify recourse to nuclear counter-attack on our own cities? This is the second front which has to be attacked, and it is surely no less important than the tactical front line.

The burden of this article is that we should devise, and if necessary undertake, military operations which produce widespread inconvenience, discomfort, dislocation, or even humorous embarrassment, as opposed to wholesale destruction of property and loss of life. Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry has recently reminded us that British air power on the North-West Frontier of India produced results by compelling tribes to evacuate their villages, in other words by dislocation and inconvenience. Economic sanctions and naval blockade have sought similar results on a national scale but, apart from the difficulty of closing all loopholes, these methods are generally too slow in having an effect. The writer believes, however, that there are other ways of producing, fairly quickly, general dislocation and widespread inconvenience.

Purely as a hypothetical, and I hope unlikely, example, let us assume that Communist China has resumed the offensive in Korea, entered Siam, or otherwise committed aggression. A substantial percentage of the trade and life of China moves along or lives near the three great rivers—the Hwang Ho, the Yellow River, and the Si-kiang. An underwater explosion in the Great Gorge of the Yellow River and in selected portions of the other two watercourses could probably be designed to produce limited contamination of these streams for a short period. Underwater nuclear explosions are reputed to have this very effect. A little research should produce a thoroughly obnoxious but less provocative agent for use in the first instance. Suitable warning that one of these three rivers would be thus 'treated' in its poorly populated upper reaches might well necessitate temporary evacuation by several million people who are normally resident in the heavily populated areas downstream. Such action coupled with suitable propaganda (as discussed later) could produce a tide of opinion which would query the need for the war and be interested in an early solution. Given some research and development effort, I believe our technical and military ingenuity is capable of this sort of operation, except perhaps when the rivers used in this hypothetical example freeze up in mid-winter.

Even if technically, operationally, or politically, this particular type of operation is not practicable, military methods of producing widespread inconvenience can surely be contrived. Detailed study of the geography, climatology, social habits, and economy of potentially hostile countries will suggest a number of ways of achieving this from the air in a relatively humane way. The introduction into such rivers of an utterly objectionable but harmless odour which would persist, say, for two weeks, or make the rice crop distasteful without destroying it—these are the

sort of thing which would cause widespread discomfort and also avoid the odium associated with nuclear contamination. Nor need we restrict ourselves to rivers—prevailing winds and ocean currents can be our allies. There must in fact be a whole variety of ways of causing dislocation without mass slaughter and widespread destruction of property. Let us hope that no enemy planner devises a way of denying to the U.K. its beer or tobacco !

To exploit our opportunities we may have to increase the variety of weapons in our inventory and adjust our operational training. However, it is time the Western Powers stopped thinking almost exclusively in terms of the H.E., incendiary, and nuclear bombs designed to suit European and Japanese targets in campaigns of the first and second World War types. The adoption of subtle tactics and modified weapons instead of brute force and blast may be part of the answer of keeping a limited war under control.

Retaliation in similar vein must be anticipated and our own vulnerability examined. We may not be able to prevent counter-attack in kind, but retaliation which causes inconvenience and dislocation is less to be feared than atomic bombs on our capital cities or centres of population. Any new ingenious method which reduces the risk of direct nuclear retaliation against our cities will be more acceptable to our N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. partners than some of our present policies, and will therefore minimize the possibility of broken alliances.

It may be argued that military action against the enemy homeland will inevitably spread the conflict and that, to be effective, major disruption must be achieved. While conceding the force of this argument, it must be remembered that both sides will be interested in preserving the limited character of the war, as for example they were in Korea. It is also assumed that we have in advance clearly publicized our limited operational aim and our terms for a truce.

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONCOMITANTS

If the objectives behind our military operations are not represented correctly, our actions may serve to unite the enemy nation and others against us. The enemy political leaders and those members of the enemy community who can influence them must also be made aware of the reasonable alternatives open to them. We must generate doubts as to whether the inconvenience they are suffering is in fact unavoidable and worthwhile from their point of view. The enemy's ears and eyes are the vital third front.

Dr. Kissinger has already suggested that diplomatic relations between belligerents should not be broken off, for diplomacy will be necessary to ensure that our opponent obtains the information he requires to make correct decisions. While it may not be practicable to maintain an embassy in the capital city of an enemy nation, Dr. Kissinger's suggestion has much point. We must somehow keep open a channel for direct negotiation with our enemy, and use this channel constantly.

This, however, is not enough, because under present conditions information so transmitted may not be widely circulated; it may be deliberately suppressed. There are also other complicating factors. Once war is started, deep-seated forces of popular passion can be generated which reek nothing of reason. Once these passions are loose, they are too often fermented by the press, the radio stations, and other organs which influence public opinion. How to counter the propaganda of unscrupulous dictatorships, sensation-seeking journalists, and the irrational element

in any society in the period which precedes and follows the start of hostilities is a contentious problem. Although this is perhaps best left to diplomats and experts in political warfare, a few tentative suggestions can be examined.

To meet this requirement we need, ideally, an objective press and radio service in every country. These would present as impartially as possible the views of both parties in any international dispute. The operation of these facilities in enemy territory, even under the control of a U.N. commission or neutral committee, is scarcely practical politics at this stage. However, for reasons which follow, some gradual progress in this direction might perhaps be possible in certain areas.

President Eisenhower has recently advocated, in the United States, the monitoring of inflammatory broadcasts in the Middle East. While this is desirable, it is suggested that complementary action—the dissemination of a more truthful picture—is more likely to be accepted than any form of United Nations censorship of internal broadcasts. There has already been some degree of acceptance of a 'U.N. presence' in the Middle East. Would this presence not be more effective if it had its own broadcasting and press facilities, giving equal time and space to both parties in any dispute? These facilities would ensure that the alternative courses in any such situation become widely known to the peoples in the area. The desirability of presenting important U.N. debates and the reports of observer teams could be advanced as arguments towards acceptance of such a scheme in peacetime. Other functions might perhaps be medical and cultural broadcasts. Jamming or sabotage of these stations would alienate the neutral groups who operated them for U.N.O.

If such a scheme could be put into operation, we would at least have something to counter, from a neutral rostrum, deception and propaganda in peace and incipient war. Similar facilities serving Indonesia/West New Guinea, the Formosa Channel, Korea, and Indo-China might well be considered, in spite of the immense language difficulties, as part of any interim settlement of current difficulties. If we can reach the minds of the people at large, we can restrict the freedom of action enjoyed by dictators and fanatic groups. Neither the 'Voice of America' nor the B.B.C. will ever receive the attention which would be given to a United Nations facility which provided a regular news service and equal opportunity for presentation of the views of both parties.

Ultimately, agreement to the establishment of such U.N. facilities in all major countries might be made a condition of U.N.O. membership. This long term suggestion will no doubt be criticized as idealistic, but is it more optimistic than our immense and costly efforts, over ten years, to negotiate international inspection of nuclear stocks and armaments? The West could accede without fear and our agreement might well induce the neutral group in U.N.O. to support the proposal. For the present it would be a worthwhile advance to establish facilities wherever we can in the areas adjacent to the Communist *bloc*, i.e. in the Middle East and near the trouble spots in the Far East. Even if these facilities were suspended on occasions, their existence in critical periods would not be without influence both at the time and subsequently. We may safely assume that an increasing proportion of the influential people, even in Asia, will acquire the new low cost radio receivers.

The seeds of thought which we try to sow *via* either the suggested U.N. facilities or by means of our own propaganda will have less chance of germinating if they fall on unprepared soil. Radio stations and newspapers take several years to build up a reputation for truth and impartiality, and until they do this they are

not really influential. It follows that these facilities must function now, in peacetime, if we or U.N.O. wish to have the capability of influencing the leading elements in neutral and potentially aggressive countries in a period of tension or limited hostilities.

Obviously the potential effect of our propaganda and appeals will be influenced by our foreign policy in peace and by the respect we generate through our conduct in international disputes. As a sample of international fair dealing which could generate respect, a recent example is Sir John Slessor's suggestion in London that Hong Kong should become an international port under the protection of the United Nations, with an international force for internal security. In due course the people of Hong Kong would presumably themselves determine their own future under free conditions and without intimidation. But how many people in the neutral and Asiatic *bloc* ever hear such suggestions ?

This section opened by pointing to the need for appropriate political action to accompany our military overtures. It has become obvious that action should also precede a conflict to develop our channels of access to the people we may need to influence. If our present effort is inadequate in scale or quality, we are making it easier for the dictators to threaten our security at will.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To sum up, there appears to be a case for experimenting with new types of naval, military, and air operations in which the aim is not mass destruction of life or property but inconvenience, dislocation, and embarrassment of varying degrees by subtle and relatively humane methods. Our limited war plans should be based on careful study of enemy vulnerability and the special opportunities which present themselves in various countries with due regard to geography, climatology, national habits, and economic systems. We must develop the means of applying pressure of a relatively humane type on the influential sections of potential enemies while at the same time we contain or otherwise deal with the military forces engaged in the actual aggression. The enemy national capital and similar centres must be subjected to pressures apart from those generated by developments in the front line. If nuclear weapons have to be used for this, the *modus operandi* must be such that it does not completely alienate world opinion or justify nuclear massacre in our cities.

Concurrently with the military campaign there must be a major psychological and diplomatic campaign to ensure that our limited objectives become known to the influential sections of the enemy nation. For this, new methods of access to the ears of our adversaries must be developed. Adequate and objective means of reaching the ears of Asia and the Middle East do not appear to exist, and a vigorous diplomatic effort to improve this is suggested. 'Open ears' and 'open eyes' are just as important as 'open skies,' and may be no harder to achieve—possibly easier. If we can reach the minds of other nations now, we can restrict the freedom of action enjoyed there by dictators and fanatic groups. We can also build up the audience we need in a crisis.

Nothing in the above is incompatible with the philosophy of a deterrent force. But if fighting starts we should try to achieve our aim in the first instance by military ingenuity and political acumen before we start using the big stick. We can and must extend the range of military options open to us. We should not only study these possibilities in peacetime but take positive steps to put ourselves in a position to implement some of them should the occasion unfortunately arise.

HITLER'S ADMIRALS

REFLECTIONS INSPIRED BY THEIR MEMOIRS

By COMMANDER M. G. SAUNDERS, R.N.

THE recent publication of the memoirs of Hitler's principal Admirals, Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz, provides a yardstick by which to judge these two men, who bore exceptionally heavy responsibilities in the second World War.¹ In all countries the memoirs of prominent personalities usually omit or gloss over events and decisions which, when seen in retrospect, reflect no credit on the authors; moreover, history is never lenient towards the associates of tyrants and oppressors. To evaluate the professional and personal qualities of these two former enemies, we should therefore shed any lingering wartime prejudices; but it is also essential to check their memoirs with other sources, which can sometimes be far more reliable. Fortunately there is an abundance of these, such as the contemporary German naval archives, the British official history of the war at sea, and, not least, a handful of German writers whose vocation enabled them to stand apart from the heat of battle and the clash of personalities. Notable among the latter is Vice-Admiral Kurt Assmann, an experienced naval historian, whose two post-war works show a praiseworthy objectivity.² Another useful source is Professor Walther Hubatsch, of Bonn University, whose critical analysis of German naval policy and higher staff organization between 1848 and 1945 is the latest contribution to a subject that has been elaborated by a host of lesser German writers.³

Grand Admiral Raeder

Grand Admiral Raeder is now in his eighty-fourth year. His memoirs, published in Germany in two volumes, cover 50 years' naval service, including 15 as head of the Navy. The English one-volume edition starts in 1928, so that readers in this country will miss the better written and interesting material on the fluctuating fortunes of the German Navy in the first World War, the revolution, and the first years of the Weimar Republic. While on the subject of English editions, it is curious that publishers should employ translators possessing no specialized knowledge of naval affairs. This results in a number of inaccurate passages, especially in Dönitz's book, which abounds in the technicalities of submarine warfare.

Raeder's second volume in particular cannot compare in quality with his excellent history of German cruiser operations written shortly after the first World War. We must remember that he was old and in poor health after ten years' confinement at Spandau, nor could he refer to German or Allied documentary sources in regard to the second World War. Nevertheless, by omitting statistics and technical data and concentrating on the highlights of success and failure and on the broad questions of policy during his years at the head of the Navy, he has produced a picture which reveals his abilities no less than his limitations. On the whole it is an honest picture, evoking the author's upright character and sincerity.

¹ *Struggle for the Sea*, by Grand Admiral Raeder, Translated by Edward Fitzgerald (Kimber, 25s.); *Admiral Donitz's Memoirs*, Translated by R. H. Stevens in collaboration with David Woodward (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 36s.).

² Kurt Assmann: (a) *Deutsche Schicksalsjahre* (Eberhard Brockhaus, Wiesbaden, 1950); (b) *Deutsche Seestrategie in Zwei Weltkriegen* (Scharnhorst Kameradschaft, Heidelberg, 1957).

³ Walther Hubatsch: *Der Admiralstab* (Verlag für Wehrwesen Bernard & Graefe, Frankfurt/Main, 1958).

In 1913 Raeder was appointed as chief staff officer to Admiral Hipper, commander of the First Scouting Group of the High Seas Fleet, with whom he remained until the end of 1917, participating in the Dogger Bank action and the Battle of Jutland. His brief descriptions of these and other operations contain nothing new, but show his profound admiration for the Admiral whom he served so long. At the beginning of 1918, Raeder was given command of the new light cruiser *Köln*, where he remained only nine months. It should be noted that, except for a few weeks as Flag Officer of the North Sea Light Forces in 1923, he never again in his long career held a seagoing command.

When Germany collapsed in chaos and revolution in November, 1918, Raeder was one of the officers chosen to deal with the problems of indiscipline and uncertainty in the skeleton Navy allowed by the Versailles Treaty. His name became associated with, though he was not involved in, the *Kapp Putsch* of 1920, and to avoid political repercussions he was appointed to the Navy's historical section to write the official history of the German cruisers' overseas operations—an experience that was to prove valuable 20 years later when his own Admiralty staff had to organize supplies in distant waters for ships attacking British merchant shipping. In 1922, as a rear-admiral, he became director of officers' training, a subject on which he held strong views. His object was to build out of the ruins a highly disciplined body of officers and men who would set an example to the Army and other sections of the community. He expected his officers to have a strict moral code, to live unostentatiously in their private lives, to leave politics severely alone, and to encourage freedom of religious worship. To our way of thinking such precepts would perhaps be taken for granted in any senior officer, but we should remember that in the inter-war years in Germany there was much moral laxity and political and economic unrest, from which the Wehrmacht was by no means exempt.

In 1925 Raeder became Flag Officer, Baltic, and three years later President Hindenburg appointed him head of the Navy. He was the only higher commander of the armed forces to enjoy the confidence of two such different systems as the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship during 15 years of intense internal and external strife. This does not imply that he had a particular aptitude for getting on with widely different people, but rather that he managed to keep the Navy entirely free from the political repercussions of Hitler's bid for power. It was an unique achievement in a man whose personal ambitions were always subordinated to his particular concept of duty. Those who would denigrate him—in Germany they included Heydrich and Göring—could attempt to do so only on the controversial grounds of what constituted duty in Hitler's strange hierarchy; they could never impugn either the sincerity of his beliefs or his professional competence.

Like the great majority of his countrymen, Raeder welcomed Hitler's accession to power in January, 1933, believing that he alone could free the country from the humiliation of Versailles and the appalling economic difficulties of that period. The Admiral does not attempt to conceal his support for secret naval re-armament in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, which began long before Hitler came on the scene. We may here reflect that in two categories of weapons—the magnetic mine and the submarine—German efficiency at the outbreak of war was largely due to continuous under-cover experimentation, and construction in Holland and Spain during the Weimar Republic, whereas the uneven quality of the propelling plant in the more modern surface warships could be ascribed to the break in continuity of design and construction imposed by the treaty.

Raeder took a personal pride in the successful conclusion of the Anglo-German naval negotiations in 1935, for he was then convinced that the two countries should never again fight each other. At that time his building policy was designed to produce a small balanced fleet which, when allied to that of Italy, could stand up to the combined naval power of the only likely opponents—France and Poland. But at this point we find that Raeder's clearly stated attitude towards Great Britain is incompatible with the rapid progress of German naval rearmament, and perhaps the weakest point in his memoirs is that he offers no explanation for this discrepancy. If the increasing aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign policy during the next four years did not induce in him a feeling of alarm, we can only conclude that he was no different from other highly placed German authorities who refused to see that Hitler was going too far. Raeder states that by 1938—presumably at the time of the Munich crisis when both the British and the German navies were placed on a war footing—he had "begun to doubt Hitler's honesty". Yet in January, 1939, three months before Hitler publicly renounced the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, the provocative 'Z Plan' was secretly approved and allotted a higher priority than any other re-armament. It would have given Germany by 1946 no less than 10 major capital ships, three battle-cruisers, eight armoured cruisers or pocket battleships (all with a big radius of action), 44 light cruisers, 68 destroyers, numerous smaller torpedo craft, and between 250 and 300 submarines.

Professor Hubatsch severely criticizes Raeder and the naval staff for washing their hands of any political responsibility for the 'Z plan', and he points out that only four years had elapsed since the government of the Reich had solemnly pledged its "final and lasting adherence" to the terms of the London Naval Agreement. He also emphasizes that the objective of the 'Z plan'—nothing less than to disrupt Britain's communications by sea and destroy her sea power—failed to take account of all previous experience in regard to Germany's commitments as a continental power.⁴

Raeder asserts that it was the greatest tragedy of his life when, contrary to Hitler's repeated assurances, the clash with Great Britain came on 3rd September, 1939. We cannot escape the conclusion that his aversion to war with Great Britain was not so much a matter of principle as of timing.

Let us now turn to the situation which faced him on that fateful day. How could he hope to wage war effectively against Great Britain and France when his aggregate naval strength was equivalent to less than one-tenth of that of his opponents, and his few operational bases were unfavourably situated for offensive action? The course of naval operations is to be found in the official histories, and here we shall only summarize the results during the three years and four months when Raeder was at the helm, and outline the home background against which he had to operate. Overcoming immense difficulties by good strategic planning and technical organization, in which he was greatly helped by his three principal staff officers—Rear-Admirals Schniewind, Fricke, and Meisel—he succeeded in inflicting the most grievous damage on the maritime power of Great Britain and the United States, while at the same time keeping the Russian Navy at bay in the Arctic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. Up to the end of 1942, German U-boats alone had caused the loss of 2,177 merchant ships, aggregating over 11,000,000 tons,⁵ as well as many

⁴ Hubatsch, *Op. cit.*, pp. 209–10.

⁵ This amounts to 70 per cent. of the total tonnage sunk by all Axis submarines throughout the war.

valuable warships, and the Allies were still uncertain when and how the U-boat menace would be mastered. Admittedly this formidable destruction, which had its debit side in heavy German losses, was greatly helped by the initial unpreparedness of the Allies and by their incredible neglect of the naval lessons of the first World War, particularly in regard to the protection of convoys. It is true that the German surface ships and submarines became much more dangerous through the early acquisition of advanced bases on the French Atlantic coast and in Norway, though we should remember that this was never the main purpose of the military operations that led to their capture.

If Dönitz was the chief operator of this destruction, Raeder and his staff were the architect and directors of it all. The achievement was all the more remarkable in view of the highly unsatisfactory higher organization for war, which will now be briefly outlined.

In 1932, in the Weimar Republic, the War Minister was a politician responsible to the Chancellor and to Parliament for the Wehrmacht, which then consisted of the Army and Navy, since Germany was not allowed an air force. When Hitler came to power in the following year he selected General Blomberg to combine the offices of War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. This was the first danger-sign for, as a soldier, Blomberg was more apt to interfere with the functions of the heads of the services than to perform his political duties, a function that in the Nazi system had lost its meaning. Early in 1938, when Blomberg was compelled to resign over a scandalous marriage, Hitler seized the opportunity to make himself Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, a step which Assmann describes as the virtual 'decapitation' of the armed forces, whose full significance seems to have escaped the officers most affected.⁶ It proved to be the start of a process of divesting the generals of all real power in their own profession.

Already Hitler believed that he had acquired sufficient knowledge of military affairs to rid himself of unaccommodating military advisers. He created the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (O.K.W.) and chose General Keitel, a weak and compliant personality, as Chief of Staff, with Lieut.-General Jodl, a military brain in the general staff tradition, as head of the operations division. Supporting these key men were a relatively small number of inter-Service staff officers. Theoretically this was an appropriate organization for directing and co-ordinating the broad strategic policy in war, but in practice it proved the opposite. The new Air Force was much too independent under the influential and unprofessional Reichsmarshal Göring, who was also Minister for the Four Year Plan and Premier of Prussia. This left the field wide open to Hitler, who increasingly assumed control of the whole apparatus, leaving only the Navy, about whose functions in war he was ill-informed, in the hands of Raeder.

The Admiral, always reluctant to jeopardize his own control of naval affairs, appointed only junior officers with little authority to the staff of O.K.W. Thus Raeder could run the naval war in his own way. His advice on the naval aspects of the invasion of Norway and the planned invasion of England was heeded. His policy until the spring of 1941 can be summed up in a few words. The sorties from Norwegian fiords or from Brest by surface warships into the Atlantic were designed to cause as much damage as possible to shipping while forcing the British to provide cover for convoys in the form of capital ships. The small number of armed merchant

⁶ Assmann, *Op. cit.* (b), p. 127.

raiders was to operate in more distant waters, where they would be re-fuelled by supply ships. But the main effort against Allied shipping was always borne by the U-boats, which could have been far more effective if there had been an adequate naval air arm. It is to be noted that except in the Norwegian campaign all *other* German naval operations, such as attempts to repel invasions in North Africa and Normandy, or to hold the Aegean islands, had a relatively subsidiary character.

Yet Raeder's days of freedom were numbered. Hitler had been very upset over the outcome of the Battle of the River Plate, and was always extremely agitated when the big ships were at sea. The loss of the *Bismarck* in May, 1941, not only marked the end of long-range operations by the surface warships, but heralded his direct intervention in naval dispositions and operational directives. In December, 1941, when the war had become world-wide, he completed his ascendancy over the Wehrmacht by accepting Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch's resignation over a disagreement on the conduct of the Russian campaign, and himself assumed the vacant post of C.-in-C. of the Army.

This, then, was the background against which Raeder and his staff had to work. The War Cabinet existed only on paper, there was no Chiefs of Staff Committee, no Joint Planning or Intelligence Staffs, and no machinery for integrating the economic, military, and political policy. The whole system depended on the intuition and directive energy of Hitler, sometimes modified through the fortuitous presence of this or that adviser. As for Raeder, it mattered less and less that his strategic concepts were sound, for his influence on Hitler, never very strong, was already on the wane when the fatal plan to attack Russia was hatching in the Führer's mind. Notable among his interviews with Hitler, and illustrative of Raeder's strategic ideas at a time when Germany was still flushed with victory, was the long meeting between the two men on 26th September, 1940. Unaware that Hitler was already thinking of attacking Russia, he warned him against breaking the Russo-German pact of non-aggression, as this would probably lead to a two-front war. Raeder wanted to offer big inducements to France to collaborate in the German use of the West African bases, and he believed this to be feasible since events at Oran and Dakar had generated much French animosity towards Great Britain. He wanted a combined German and Italian thrust towards Suez. He pleaded that the Mediterranean should be mastered before the main effort was concentrated against Great Britain.

At the end of the two hours' talk, Raeder was confident that Hitler had been convinced of the need to continue the war on these lines. Meanwhile Molotov's visit to Berlin in November had shown Hitler that all was not well with Russo-German relations, and on 18th December he issued the directive to the heads of the armed forces to prepare for an attack on Russia. At the end of December Raeder made a last forlorn effort to dissuade Hitler. In this writer's view the September meeting is historically important because it represents the only serious strategic alternative plan ever suggested by any of Hitler's advisers. Had it been heeded, it could have entirely changed the course of the war.

Raeder's contemporary views on other strategic questions, as recorded in his memoirs, are confirmed by the documentary evidence. We need not go into them here, except to comment that they were usually based on sound common sense. It is only when we come to examine his record in personal relations and organizational questions that certain defects emerge. He ruled the Navy with a firm hand, and although he maintains that he always expected subordinate flag and staff

officers to express their ideas freely, there is some evidence that he was apt to regard outspoken criticism as a breach of discipline and trust. His failure at the outbreak of war to appoint an experienced flag officer as his representative at O.K.W., which had unfortunate results for the Navy, is attributed by Assmann to his fear that such an officer would go his own way and persuade Hitler to agree to policies of which Raeder himself could not approve.⁷

As the war progressed, Raeder became increasingly ill at ease in Hitler's presence, and avoided meeting him except on vital issues. He was not prepared to explain the elementary facts of sea power to a man whose ideas on the subject sprang from a good memory of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, a superficial acquaintance with the role of the High Seas Fleet in 1914-18, and a fantastic notion that utter devotion to the Nazi cause would help to cure the Navy of its weaknesses. Until after Dunkirk, Hitler firmly believed that Great Britain would come to terms, a delusion that was directly responsible for the relatively low priority of U-boat construction in the first year of the war. In those days it took 22 months to build a U-boat, whereas in 1944, when it was too late, the adoption of serialized sectional construction had reduced the time to between seven and nine months. Hitler's ignorance of naval warfare was never so clearly displayed as in January, 1943. In a rage after the failure of the *Hipper* operation against an Arctic convoy, he ordered all the big warships to be paid off so that their guns could be mounted along the Norwegian coast to meet the illusory threat of invasion. For Raeder this was the last straw. On three previous occasions, two of which dated from before the war, he had offered to resign, and now he was allowed to do so.

Before we leave Raeder, reference must be made to another organizational defect, the cumbersome chain of command between the S.K.L. in Berlin, the two naval group commanders at their shore headquarters on the Baltic and the North Sea, and the Flag Officer afloat. Hemmed in by severe operational restrictions, subject to conflicting directives from these three land-based headquarters and from O.K.W., it is not surprising that the sea-going commanders were often uncertain how far they should commit their ships to action. In his book Raeder attaches little importance to these disadvantages, but the evidence of opportunities missed by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and by the *Hipper* and *Lützow* speaks against him. Could it be that his own lack of sea-going experience led him to underrate the importance of leaving tactical decisions to the senior officer afloat?

Raeder must be judged on his record—on the integrity of his strategic appreciations, the effectiveness of his training policy, and the results achieved by his initially limited forces. It is idle to forecast what might have occurred if he had been able to secure immediate and absolute priority for the U-boat campaign, with all the concomitant needs of maritime air power and shipbuilding facilities. For these requirements could hardly have been met without depriving the other branches of the Wehrmacht of essential armaments. Much closer naval co-ordination should have been achieved with Italy, and later with Japan. But this was mainly a political problem which Hitler alone could have solved. Much has been said in Grand Admiral von Tirpitz's day of the *Bündnisfähigkeit*—the alliance value—of a fleet in being, but the second World War showed that for Germany naval alliances could also become a liability.

In an unchivalrous age there may be few who will show much interest in an aged and defeated opponent of two wars. Yet some at least of the older generation

⁷ Assmann, *Op. cit.* (b) p. 150.

of British naval officers, looking back beyond the years of Germany's political debasement, will recall that Jutland was a trial of strength between fighting men, where both sides displayed the skill and devotion to duty which are inherent in their professions. They will remember Raeder's fine gesture in sending the commander of the German Fleet, Admiral Foerster, to London in 1935 to represent him at the funeral of Lord Jellicoe, when every German warship's flag was at half-mast. And they will accord to Raeder in the evening of his life the same respect that he has always shown for the Royal Navy.

Grand Admiral Donitz

When we come to consider Admiral Dönitz, it is at once apparent how greatly he differs from Raeder in character, outlook, and experience. He was born in 1891, and the outbreak of war in 1914 found him serving in the Mediterranean as a lieutenant in the light cruiser *Breslau* which, together with the battle cruiser *Goeben*, escaped to Turkey. There he qualified as an aircraft pilot, was put in charge of a seaplane base, and made a number of reconnaissance flights over the Dardanelles during the Gallipoli campaign. In 1916 he was sent to Germany to receive training in U-boats; returning to the Mediterranean in 1917, he served first as a watchkeeping officer and then successively as captain of *UC-25* and *UB-68*. Only five weeks before the end of the war he was attacking a convoy 150 miles east of Malta when his boat got out of control through a technical fault, plunged deep, then shot to the surface in the midst of the convoy. Coming under heavy fire, *UB-68* was so damaged that he gave the order to scuttle. He and his crew were taken prisoners and sent to England, returning to Germany nine months later. Between 1920 and 1930 Dönitz commanded various torpedo craft and flotillas. He was staff officer for the North Sea station at Wilhelmshaven, until he was chosen in 1934 to command the cruiser *Emden* on her world cruise, the first since the war in which a new German warship showed the flag in distant countries. In October, 1935, he became Senior Officer of the First U-boat Flotilla, and from then until the end of the second World War he never relinquished his position as head of the U-boat arm. Meanwhile, in January, 1943, he had succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

There is a tragic symbolism in the destiny of this man. For him both world wars ended in the foundering of his ship and captivity. But in the second it was the ship of state, the tottering Third Reich that he had inherited for a brief 20 days from Adolf Hitler. The bare outline of his career cannot convey the intense effort that Dönitz and his staff put into the training and development of the U-boats during the ten years in which he was responsible for them. Starting from scratch in October, 1935, he built up a nucleus of highly trained personnel, and already in 1937 his few boats were secretly performing exercises in wolf-pack tactics against convoys, while in Great Britain the Admiralty, unaware of these far-seeing developments, was relatively unconcerned over the possibilities of submarine attacks on shipping. When war came, Dönitz had no more than 22 boats capable of Atlantic operations, and the prospects of inflicting decisive losses on enemy shipping were poor. The 300 submarines which he stipulated as necessary for success could not be available for at least two years, and then only if absolute priority were given to the task of building them and training their crews.

The means by which Dönitz achieved tremendous results, particularly between September, 1939, and the turning-point of the Battle of the Atlantic in May, 1943, have been recorded in the British official history, and here it is proposed to discuss in the light of his memoirs only certain aspects of the U-boat campaign and of the

broader strategic and political issues that confronted him on succeeding Raeder as head of the Navy. From abundant documentary sources, no less than from his own memoirs, it is clear that Dönitz was above all a specialist in submarine warfare. While in this field his professional skill is apparent, there are also some notable failings. Let us first outline the credit side of the story. The war-time U-boat training in the relatively safe waters of the western Baltic was thoroughly and realistically organized, and no crisis or pressure from even the highest quarter would induce him to fill the gap in operational numbers until he was satisfied that his new boats and crews were fit for active service. He was often successful in resisting the numerous efforts of the naval staff (SKL) to divert U-boats from their main and most effective battleground in the North Atlantic. But when such re-dispositions were ordered by Hitler—for example, the despatch of 20 boats to Norwegian waters at the beginning of 1942 to deal with an imagined threat of invasion—he was powerless to reverse the decision and could only lament that it had lost him over 600,000 tons of potential sinkings off the American Atlantic seaboard.

His headquarters were well equipped to exploit the various sources of intelligence on the movements of enemy shipping. It is disturbing to realize that until March, 1943, a large amount of priceless intelligence of this kind came into his hands through the interception and decryption of British and American cypher messages, and that in consequence he was often able to direct his boats towards valuable targets. Thus a weakness in British cypher security compensated him in some degree for the lack of naval air reconnaissance.

When Allied anti-submarine measures, particularly in the form of air escorts to Atlantic convoys, became increasingly effective in 1942, Dönitz struck some shrewd and well-timed blows at focal points of unprotected shipping in remoter waters, such as the Caribbean, the Cape, and the Indian Ocean, and he was always quick to seize opportunities for surprise action. But his analysis of the cause of the Atlantic defeat of May, 1943, as given to an audience of senior naval commanders at Weimar in the following December, was over-simplified. He insisted that the real and only cause of the hiatus in the Atlantic was the enemy's great superiority in radar, and that things would improve as soon as the new 'electronic brains trust' under Professor Kupfmüller had restored the situation. He evidently failed to appreciate that the Allied success against his U-boats was the cumulative result of better weapons, tactics, and training, the co-operation of surface and air escorts, and many other technical and organizational improvements. He remained an optimist long after the turning-point, always hoping and inspiring others to hope that new devices—radar and asdic decoys, acoustic and pattern-running torpedoes, schnorchel and revolutionary propulsion for U-boats—would restore the capacity to sink ships faster than they could be built; until very near the end he kept Hitler alive to these alluring but always doubtful prospects. This tenacity is a laudable quality in any military leader in adversity, even if in Dönitz's case it sprang from faulty premises or was inspired by the lack of any effective alternative. He reasoned that since the Allies had announced their policy of unconditional surrender, he could do no more than make things as uncomfortable for them as possible by never relaxing the threat to their shipping.

Another feat for which Dönitz must be given full credit is the remarkable eleventh hour organization for evacuating some 2,000,000 German nationals—civilians, troops, and wounded—from East Prussia and the Baltic States while under heavy pressure from the Russians. This operation, far bigger than Dunkirk,

was comparable to it in the speed of its improvisation. It was a last frantic effort to escape the fearsome clutches of the Russian bear.

Finally it should be noted that Dönitz enjoyed the confidence of his subordinates; he took great pains to know individual captains of U-boats and to ease the severe strain of war for them and their crews by constant attention to their comfort and welfare while in harbour. Of the 40,000 officers and men of the U-boat arm, no less than 28,000 perished in the struggle. To Dönitz this heavy toll, which included his own son and represented the highest casualty rate in any branch of the German armed forces, was justified by his steadfast appreciation that the U-boat was the *only* weapon in the whole German armoury that could have won the war, and that already in 1943 it constituted the sole remaining means of offensive warfare.

Now, however, we must turn to another side of the picture, where there are no laurels. The reader of Dönitz's memoirs is left in no doubt that he was often let down by other departments of the war machine inside and outside the Navy. Here it is the SKL which fails to secure absolute priority for U-boat construction and repairs, or has wrong ideas on the disposition of the boats, or wishes to relieve him of the responsibility for new construction and new designs of boats. There it is the failure of the torpedo experimental establishment to provide an efficient torpedo, or the highly unsatisfactory state of radar in relation to that of the enemy. Next it is the failure of the *politische Staatsführung*—and this can only mean Hitler—to harmonize political and armaments policies or to provide an adequate naval air arm, and so on. But if we examine these complaints in the light of established facts, we come to the conclusion that in certain cases Dönitz himself cannot escape responsibility for the mistakes which he is so ready to impute to others. In this respect he differs from Raeder, who always accepted responsibility for things that went wrong during his term of office.

Space will not allow us to enter into details of more than one or two cases. Let us first consider the charge that serious defects in the torpedo, the key weapon of destruction, persisted until the end of 1942. Dönitz makes the incredible assertion that the T.V.A. (torpedo trials establishment) failed to realize the importance of accurate depth-keeping in torpedoes using magnetic pistols, and that no protracted depth-keeping trials were ever made at Eckernförde until the Norwegian campaign had shown the inefficiency of the torpedoes. If that is so, why did Dönitz not ensure a close and constant liaison, especially in pre-war days, between the designers, manufacturers, and experimenters on the one hand, and the users of the weapon on the other? Eckernförde was 'across the water' from his headquarters at Kiel. Imagine the late Admiral Sir Max Horton, as Flag Officer Submarines at Gosport, allowing the development of submarine torpedoes to take place without knowing what was going on 'across the water' in H.M.S. *Vernon* in Portsmouth, or at Greenock and Loch Long? We, too, had our troubles with magnetic pistols, as did the Americans, and no doubt there were avoidable faults in both cases. But this tendency to mind one's own business in the narrowest sense, this readiness to wear blinkers, was a characteristic of many Germans in responsible positions, and fortunately it had no counterpart in the British organization. It lay at the root of many German failings, not only in technical matters, such as the tardy development of sectional construction for U-boats,⁸ or of radar and radar counter-measures, but above all in the wider field of policy and strategy.

⁸ First suggested in June, 1943, by Merker, director of an engineering firm not connected with shipbuilding.

Now let us consider some further weaknesses in Dönitz's memoirs. Reference has already been made to his obsession with mere numbers. Out of its proper context, which referred to the situation before Trafalgar, he quotes Nelson's dictum that "only numbers can annihilate." But in the case of his own U-boats nothing could be further from the truth. Throughout 1944 he had an average of 166 boats available for operations, and no less than 270 boats undergoing trials and training. Yet this potent array of force was by then powerless to inflict any serious damage on Allied shipping, still less to annihilate it. Presumably Dönitz wishes to imply that *if* he had possessed 300 U-boats at the outbreak of war, and supposing that his opponents had taken no counter-measures, he could have achieved victory.

We may wonder that in the period when he was head of the Navy, his memoirs are so meagre on the wider strategic questions which, by virtue of his office, he discussed on his frequent visits to Hitler. This omission may be explained by the documentary evidence that in such matters Dönitz's views were usually either impracticable or merely an echo of Hitler's. Here we must confine ourselves to one example in each category. In May, 1943, the result of Allied air and sea attacks on U-boats had reached a peak, and Dönitz correctly foresaw that U-boats crossing the Bay of Biscay would meet with increasing difficulties. Already it took them ten days to cross the Bay. At this late stage in the war, when Germany was on the defensive almost everywhere, he proposed to Hitler that Spain should be occupied and Gibraltar captured to provide safer and more effective operational bases for his U-boats. Rejecting this proposal, Hitler said that in 1940, with Franco ready to co-operate, it might have been feasible, but now it would involve using first-class divisions which were simply not available; and in any case Spanish guerillas would play havoc with the German lines of communication.

An example in the second category is to be found in Dönitz's lecture on the war situation to senior officers on 15th February, 1944. After surveying the position in other areas, he turned to the Crimea. He was most emphatic that *in his view* the peninsula (which had long been isolated from the German southern Armies) should be held at all costs. Here he was in fact supporting Hitler against the unanimous opinion of the Chief of the Army General Staff, the C.-in-C., Southern front, and the commander of the 17th Army, all of whom had been urging the evacuation ever since October, 1943. We know that when Hitler finally gave his consent on 8th May, 1944, the 200,000 German and Rumanian troops in the Crimea had already lost one-third of their numbers, and less than half of the 70,000 troops besieged in Sevastopol managed to escape.⁹

An even less pleasing feature of Dönitz is the misleading presentation of his attitude towards Hitler and National Socialism. If he were frank, he would admit that he supported Hitler and the Nazi idea through thick and thin. Here is an extract from a document addressed to sundry naval authorities over his signature on 4th March, 1945:

"Let us trust the leadership of Adolf Hitler unreservedly. Believe me, in my two years' activity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I have experienced only that in his strategic and operational views the Führer was invariably right. Very often he alone held these views. Our war situation would be better today if all executive military authorities had shown undivided trust in him and had acted accordingly."

⁹ Von Tippelskirch: *History of the Second World War*, German 2nd Edition, p. 379.

In Dönitz's book we shall look in vain for even a faint echo of this unequivocal attitude. Instead we shall find him emphasizing that he could make Hitler change his mind over the decommissioning of the big ships, that he could stand up to the Führer when the honour and competence of the Navy were at stake, and that he refused to allow the Nazi 'guidance officers' to exert their influence on the Navy as they were doing in the other two branches of the Wehrmacht. He ends on an ingenuous note, confessing that he knew nothing of the concentration camps until the atrocities were revealed at Nürnberg—the blinkers again. Finally he admits that, seen in retrospect, there must be something wrong with the *Führerprinzip*.

CONCLUSIONS

It may be idle to rake up the dead ashes of the past, and yet these examples provide a warning to those who may still be unaware of the true facts. Moreover, if we are to believe the prophets and sociologists in our midst, the world is moving inexorably towards greater power vested in fewer men over more and more people, and we have certainly not seen the last of dictatorships.¹⁰ Hence the lessons of the immediate past are very relevant to the kind of world we may expect.

If in regard to the second World War the memoirs of the German Admirals are sometimes disappointing and even misleading, this is not to say that they are valueless. As regards German naval policy and operations we have been well served by Captain S. W. Roskill's *History of the War at Sea*, the first in modern times to make full use of the records of both sides in a great conflict. But such records cannot always reveal the interplay of personalities, the weakness and vanity of men as well as their strength and tenacity. In the last analysis wars are won or lost not by new weapons, techniques, or devices, but by the qualities of the men who rule. Taking the long view, we may say that the German rulers in two world wars ignored the lessons of the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic wars, in which the military power of France was dissipated in the mistaken belief that the continental war would suffice to decide the issue. In our own century Germany twice possessed a weapon which, if rightly used, might have brought her maritime enemies to their knees. Yet she lost the wars not through the inadequacy of the U-boats, or of the men who controlled and manned them, but through the failure of her rulers to keep the objectives within the bounds of available resources.

On 22nd September, 1914, Lieutenant Weddigen in *U-9* sank three British cruisers within 75 minutes, so marking a turning-point in naval warfare. Today the submarine in its latest guise, nuclear-propelled and armed with nuclear missiles, represents the most cunning instrument of destruction ever devised by man. Yet the chief lesson of the past—and one which certain extreme advocates of American 'submarine navalism' might well take to heart—is that it is fatal to think in terms of one weapon as the absolute and decisive factor in war. Now, as throughout history, nations and peoples prosper only through the sound integration of political, economic, and strategic policy; the commonsense application of moral and material resources to attainable objectives. In the dangerously divided world of today, neglect of this precept by either side may well result in a cataclysm of quite immeasurable proportions.

¹⁰ See in particular *Brave New World Revisited*, by Aldous Huxley. (Chatto & Windus, 1959.)

PASSCHENDAELE AND AMIENS—II

AMIENS

By J. A. TERRAINE

THERE could scarcely be a greater contrast between two actions of the same war than that between the Battles of Passchendaele and Amiens. If the origins of the first remain obstinately complex and entangled, those of the second are palpable and compelling. If Passchendaele is the symbol of everything going wrong, Amiens is the symbol of everything coming right. If Passchendaele was an epic of drawn-out endurance, Amiens was quick surgery. Passchendaele was the last attempt of the British Army to break the enemy by sheer weight and persistence; Amiens was the battle of skill and mechanical superiority. Under Plumer, the science of applied weight, particularly weight of artillery, was brought to a very high pitch; but even at its most successful, this strategy of infinite preparation and strictly limited advance looks clumsy and antiquated beside the new science of surprise and movement that was worked out under Rawlinson on the Somme in 1918.

Ypres and the Somme were the two main battlefields of the British Armies during the first World War. On both of them the slaughter of British soldiers, the suffering, the resolution, and the heroism were prodigious. Ypres, in spite of the tactical difficulties presented by the famous Salient and the horrors of the notorious Flanders mud, was always regarded as the 'natural' place for our armies to fight in, partly for historical reasons because of the proximity of the Channel Ports, but partly also because of its remoteness from the French. Close co-operation between the two allies rarely worked well, and it was largely for this reason that the Somme was never greatly favoured. There was a sounder strategic reason too. The first Battle of the Somme, in 1916, was fought at the insistence of Joffre. It had, says the British official historian, "no strategic object except attrition." The area was chosen solely because it contained the junction of the French and British Armies; this, in the French view, would force the reluctant British to put all their strength into the fight. Their final casualty list of 415,000 indicates that they did so. In 1917, with the demoralized French Army playing a mainly passive role after the Nivelle offensive, and the Flanders campaign requiring every available man and gun, the British were able to concentrate their efforts to the north. But at the end of the year's fighting the French raised once more their familiar demand for the British to take over more of the front. Haig was forced to agree, with the result that a weakened Fifth Army found itself stretched along an untenable line covering the ill-omened Somme area. Here it was caught by the great German attack of 21st March, and flung back some 40 miles across the devastated battle area of 1916 to the very outskirts of Amiens.

Situated at the hinge of the two Allied Armies, this big rail centre now assumed a vital significance. It was to prevent the fall of Amiens that Foch was appointed Generalissimo at Haig's instigation. The necessity of freeing it once and for all from the enemy's menaces needed no stating. The strategy of counter-attacking on the Somme was equally obvious to Foch and to Haig; but was it tactically feasible? The equally compelling though more complicated strategic necessities at Ypres had been baulked by weather, ground, and the enemy's defensive system. The familiar but bitter lesson was that strategy ignores tactics at its peril. The British Army, gravely weakened after the two great German offensives against it

on the Somme on 21st March, and on the Lys on 9th April—two months during which its casualties exceeded those of four months at Passchendaele—and with its ranks only with difficulty being maintained by drafts of boys and Category 'B' men, did not appear to be the most promising tactical instrument to hand for a decisive blow. Yet its commander, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, never lost faith in it. He was the first to see an opportunity for a counter-attack, and the optimism which had been a fault in him at other times was now to be justified.

The Battle of Amiens is like the bursting through of suppressed, frustrated forces. The unshakeable persistence of the British High Command, the steadily-acquired skills of the intermediate commands, the soldierly qualities of endurance and of dash (so often squandered), the technical and mechanical advances, the huge material product of a nation only belatedly mobilized, all at last were to come together and achieve a great result.

The first sign of this coming together was witnessed on 25th April, the third anniversary of Anzac Day, when the Australian recapture of the ruined red-brick commune of Villers Bretonneux marked definitely the high-tide line of the German advance towards Amiens. Two days previously, as the enemy swept through the mist of early morning towards the city whose cathedral spire had been their target for so long, it was observed that they were accompanied by three huge square forms—German tanks. The British infantry gave way before them; two 'female' British tanks, armed only with machine-guns, were knocked out; and then a third British tank, a 'male' with six-pounders, under Lieutenant Mitchell of the 1st Tank Battalion, knocked out one of the Germans, whereupon the other two retired. This was the first tank *versus* tank battle in history. More immediately significant, taken in conjunction with a brilliant spoiling action against a German build-up by seven Whippet tanks of the 3rd Battalion on the same day, it presaged the co-operation of tanks and Australian infantry, under General Rawlinson, which was to be a main feature of the fighting that was to follow on the Somme.

What immediately followed, however, was the continuation of the great German offensives. On the day after Villers Bretonneux was retaken, Kemmel Hill was lost. The Lys front was stabilized only by a tremendous effort on the part of both the British and the French. On 27th May the Germans switched the direction of their onslaught southward against the French front, overwhelming more British troops (who had been sent to recuperate on a 'quiet sector') in their deep penetration between Soissons and Rheims. On 9th June a second prong of this attack thrust forward in the direction of Compiègne, and the two attacks together accounted for some 70,000 prisoners and 830 guns.

It was against the background of these ominous thunders that Sir Douglas Haig, in all his imperturbability of spirit, which some have called obtuseness and some have called callousness but which was, in fact, no more than the composure of a man who is sure of his professional qualifications and acts upon them without stint or deviation, conceived the counter-stroke that was to mark the turning of the War. His diary tersely records on 17th May, ten days before the Germans began their assault against the French on the Aisne: "I told Rawlinson to begin studying in conjunction with General Debeney (Commander of the neighbouring First French Army) the question of an attack eastwards from Villers Bretonneux in combination with an attack from the French front south of Roye. I gave him details of the scheme." Two months were to pass before Haig communicated his ideas to Foch, and almost three before they could be put into practice. For the greater part of

these three months such ideas would have seemed to contain the ring of lunacy, but all the time Rawlinson and his subordinates were progressing steadily with their preparations, assembling the properties and working out the moves of the great drama.

One, in particular, of these subordinates was to play a major role, to make a distinctive contribution. This was the new commander of the Australian Army Corps, now at last assembling all its five divisions to fight together in one formation on one battlefield for the first time—Lieut.-General Sir John Monash. General Monash is the only British Commander of the first World War who leaves one in no doubt that he would have been equally at home in the second.

Certainly he stood apart from all the 'Imperial' officers with whom he served. A Jew, a civil engineer by profession, a 'part-time, Saturday-afternoon' soldier, he brought to the profession of war a seriousness and efficiency that was only rarely matched by the Regular professional soldiers. War, above all, was serious to him. One of his staff officers has told the present writer: "He treated war as a business; I don't believe he thought about anything during the War except winning the War." He lacked the affability that long regimental experience confers on the good Regular officer in his relations with other ranks; he lacked the sociability that mess life stimulates; he was not a front-line soldier. He made up for this in brain-power, organization, and relentlessness of purpose. In that war, of which the martyred infantryman has become the symbol, Monash's views on the role of infantry contain the core of his thinking, the deepest reason for his success, and the reason for the total confidence that his men placed in him. "I had formed the theory," he wrote, "that the true role of the infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort, not to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, nor to impale itself on hostile bayonets, nor to tear itself to pieces in hostile entanglements . . . but on the contrary, to advance under the maximum possible protection of the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine-guns, tanks, mortars, and aeroplanes; to advance with as little impediment as possible; to be relieved as far as possible of the obligation to *fight* their way forward; to march resolutely, regardless of the din and tumult of battle, to the appointed goal, and there to hold and defend the territory gained; and to gather, in the form of prisoners, guns, and stores, the fruits of victory."

The first indication of what this theory could mean in practice was seen at the battle of Le Hamel on 4th July. This was a small-scale, tidying-up operation, whose object was to clear the enemy out of an awkward salient between Villers Bretonneux and the Somme and to win further observation to the eastward while denying to the enemy a valuable view into our back areas. The troops concerned were some ten battalions of the 4th Australian Division, with 60 Mark V tanks and four supply tanks of the 5th Tank Brigade. Four companies of American infantry were also to make their first offensive appearance on the British front. There was strong artillery support but no preliminary preparation by the guns.

This was not a complete novelty but was still enough of a rarity; there were, however, other innovations even more important. The tanks were carefully trained beforehand in co-operation with the Australian infantry who, ever since Bullecourt in April, 1917, and the subsequent spectacle of tanks hopelessly bogged in the mud of Flanders, had been especially sceptical of their value. Now each infantry company learned to know its supporting tanks individually. General Monash believed that the tanks could go forward beside the infantry immediately behind the barrage.

There were many who doubted, pointing out the risk of the lofty tank-frames being hit by our own shells. But the thing was tried and proved entirely successful. The four carrier tanks took forward loads equal to those of a bearer party 1,250 strong. Aircraft distributed 100,000 rounds of ammunition to the machine-gunners as they occupied their new positions—the first use of an air-lift of supplies on a field of battle. Surprise was cultivated throughout.

But more important than all this was the significance that Monash attached to his battle-plan. "A perfected modern battle-plan," he wrote, "is like nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition. . . ." The stress is on the word 'perfected.' He introduced now the system that was to become standard in the Australian Corps for the rest of the war: "Although complete written orders were invariably prepared and issued . . . very great importance was attached to the holding of conferences, at which were assembled every one of the senior commanders and heads of departments concerned in the impending operation. At these I personally explained every detail of the plan, and assured myself that *all present applied an identical interpretation*¹ . . . the battle plan having been thus crystallised, *no subsequent alterations were permissible, under any circumstances*,¹ no matter how tempting." To this last point he attached the very greatest importance.

His firmness on it was not long in being put to the test. For 'political' reasons, at the last moment, Sir Douglas Haig ordered Rawlinson to withdraw the American contingent. But each American platoon had its special function in Monash's plan: "I well knew that . . . the withdrawal of those Americans would result in untold confusion . . . so I resolved to take a firm stand and press my views as strongly as I dared; for even a corps commander must use circumspection when presuming to argue with an army commander." Circumspect or not, Monash in effect told Rawlinson: "No Americans, no battle." Rawlinson agreed to leave the Americans in, and Haig readily assented to his decision when the case was put to him. Monash comments: "It appeared to me at the time that great issues had hung for an hour or so upon the chance of my being able to carry my point."

Great issues indeed had hung, for the battle that followed was an unqualified success, all over in 93 minutes. The Australians lost 51 officers and 724 other ranks, the Americans six officers and 128 enlisted men, the tanks had three machines damaged and 13 men wounded; 41 German officers, 1,431 other ranks, two field guns, 26 trench mortars, and 171 machine guns were captured. It was a clear sign: there was no mistaking what it portended. But above all it vindicated and established this method of making war, whose novelty may seem questionable to the veterans of the second World War, but which, in 1918, was a revolution. "In a well-planned battle . . ." says Monash, "*nothing happens, nothing can happen*,¹ except the regular progress of the advance according to the plan arranged. . . . It is for this reason that no stirring accounts exist of . . . great set-pieces. . . . They will never be written, for there is no material on which to base them. The story of what did take place on the day of battle *would be a mere paraphrase of the battle orders*¹ prescribing all that was to take place." This language has, indeed, a familiar ring to the generation that knew Montgomery. But the immediate point is that Monash's plan was published as a Staff brochure by G.H.Q., and his method was adopted for the whole Fourth Army in the larger attack that was now about to be launched.

For this large attack, the Battle of Amiens, General Rawlinson had four Army Corps (15 infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions) available. His artillery

¹ Present author's italics.

amounted to 2,070 guns and howitzers, one field piece to every 29 yards of front, one heavy to every 59 yards. At the peak of the Passchendaele fighting the density of artillery had been as much as one piece per 5.2 yards. It was not artillery that Rawlinson depended on to win this battle; it was the weapon of surprise—the tank. The Fourth Army had under command no less than 534 tanks (compared with 476 at Cambrai), consisting of 342 of the new and excellent Mark Vs, 72 whippets, and 120 supply tanks. Just under 800 aircraft completed the formidable mechanical array at Rawlinson's disposal. On his right the First French Army, under General Debeney, was placed by Foch under Sir Douglas Haig's orders to ensure cohesion.

But important as this massing of material strength was, it was completely overshadowed by the devotion to surprise which permeated every part of the Fourth Army plan. There had been huge material endeavours before and they had often come to nothing; surprise had been much neglected in that war yet it had always produced results. Now it was to be everything. In all details the Fourth Army staff were meticulous: secrecy was dinned into all ranks; deception was practised in every possible way. Tremendous care was taken with the registration of new batteries; all forward movement of troops or vehicles after 1st August was done by night; aeroplanes flew over the whole area to report on anything that might be seen by the enemy and appear to him suspicious. But the prodigies of secret preparation were the introduction into the area of two large formations, the presence of either of which would, if perceived, have told the enemy beyond any doubt what was afoot—the Cavalry Corps and the Canadian Corps. With the Cavalry, coming out of reserve, the problem was one entirely of concealment—difficult enough with their long horse-lines and large forage dumps in the empty uplands of the Somme; with the Canadians, already identified on the front of the First Army, the problem was even more complex. Deception on the grand scale would be required.

The performance that followed has a sound about it of the preparations for Alamein and the D-Day ruses. It was worked out by the staff of the Fourth Army; the hand of their wily commander, General Rawlinson, was obviously present. At Rawlinson's request, two Canadian battalions, with two casualty-clearing stations and the wireless section, were transferred from First Army to Second Army and put into the line opposite Kemmel Hill. This was an excellent feint, for the Canadians had so far not been engaged in any of the heavy fighting of the year; what was more likely than for the Germans to believe that this first-rate fighting unit would be used to retake the key position of the northern front? The Canadians were soon identified there and this evidence, in conjunction with greatly increased air and wireless activity in the First and Second Army zones, completely deceived the enemy. It was almost a week before they realized that they had 'lost' the Canadians, and by then the big battle was on the point of opening.

To cover the arrival of the 100,000-strong Canadian Corps in the Fourth Army area a further ruse was adopted, of the same doubly-significant order. It was decided to keep the Canadians out of the line until the very eve of the attack in order to prevent identification. The sector they were to occupy ran some 7,000 yards south of Villers Bretonneux, in the area of the First French Army. This portion of the front was now taken over by the Australian Corps—a manoeuvre which suggested the exact opposite of what was intended. It could only have been construed as a freeing of French troops for offensive action, and an anticipation of quiescence by the Australians. Not that these aggressive, active soldiers were ever particularly quiescent. In order for them to take over this new sector, their own left flank near

Morlancourt was relieved on 30th July by the British III Corps. On their last night in this sector, the Australians performed one more successful act of what they dryly termed 'peaceful penetration'—a mode of behaviour which had helped to keep this whole front fluid since April. 'Peaceful penetration' meant frequent, furious, damaging, murderous raids: this one netted three officers, 135 other ranks, 36 machine guns, and two trench mortars. The Australians came away from Morlancourt well pleased with themselves, but the anger they had stirred up was to have a mischievous effect on the big plan.

And now the plan was well advanced. On 28th July Foch issued his directive for the operation: on 3rd August he met Sir Douglas Haig to confirm the date and final details. On 5th August Haig met Rawlinson and General Debeney, with Lieut.-General Kavanagh, commanding the Cavalry Corps. He took this opportunity, in conformance with Foch's ideas, to revise parts of the Fourth Army plan which he thought to be too conservative, and to impress on those present the need for a deep advance, without any delay for the consolidation that was regarded as a statutory phase of any attack. How many times had G.H.Q. revised the plans of local commanders in this sense! How many times had the effect of the revision been greater loss of life with no compensating gain! This time, at last, and for the rest of the war, Haig's vision of victory within grasp was to be proved true.

And yet, as though to demonstrate once more the chanciness of war, even with the most careful planning, the most original thinking, the completest surprise, the following day brought an ugly shock. Reacting, after a week of preparation, to the Australian frolic of 29th July, the Germans fell upon the front of the British III Corps, north of the Somme, with a powerful assault division, newly arrived in the area. They caught the 58th and 18th Divisions in the middle of relief and quickly penetrated to a depth of some 800 yards, taking over 200 prisoners. British line divisions were neither morally nor materially the equal of the Dominion divisions at this period. Reduced to only nine battalions by the reorganization at the beginning of the year, weakened by their efforts during the great retreat, and mostly below establishment, they were now feeling the disadvantage of the voluntary system, which had allowed Kitchener to scoop the best of the nation into his 'New Armies,' leaving a relatively unleavened mass when conscription was at last applied. There was no lack of bravery, but skill and spirit were often wanting. This truth was to be vividly demonstrated by force of contrast during the next few days. Meanwhile, the weakest element of the Fourth Army—III Corps—was faced with the hardest task, for instead of resting on the eve of the great attack, it had to spend its energy on recovering this lost ground and then pass immediately into the main offensive.

The real question, however, was whether this German blow had been truly a local counter-manceuvre or whether it indicated a larger awareness of what was coming. The anxious staffs concluded that this was not the case. G.H.Q. formally named 8th August as 'the Day,' and Rawlinson and Debeney settled their zero hours: for the British, 4.20 a.m.—just before first light; for the French, 45 minutes later, since they would not be using tanks and required a short preparatory barrage. On the German side, the front-line troops were digesting Ludendorff's latest order of the day, dated 4th August, and opening with these words: "I am under the impression that, in many quarters, the possibility of an enemy offensive is viewed with a certain degree of apprehension. There is nothing to justify this apprehension, provided our troops are vigilant and do their duty . . . we should

wish for nothing better than to see the enemy launch an offensive, which can but hasten the disintegration of his forces. . . ." Shortly afterwards he drew up a more anxious paper, dwelling on the necessity for defence in depth to guard against surprise, but by the time it arrived the soldiers it was meant to instruct were mostly on their way to the Fourth Army's prisoner-of-war cages.

The day of 8th August opened with dense mist. On some parts of the front the maximum visibility was no more than ten feet. When the mist cleared a day of brilliant sunshine followed. At last the weather, which had so fatally betrayed the British Army a year before, changed sides, and the very conditions which had so much assisted the German offensive of 21st March were now to operate entirely in our favour. The rolling barrage came down with crackling precision, and the long lines of tanks and infantry swept forward through the misty half-light, Canadians on the right, Australians in the centre, III Corps on the left. Not until the mist cleared could they actually see the effect they were producing, but they began to have the 'feel' of it straight away. Except on one sector there were no checks, no untoward halts. The forward movement, necessarily slow in the mist, continued steadily; the supports, coming up behind, never collided with the front divisions, but passed through them dead on time and without a hitch. By seven o'clock the Australians were all on their first objective; by half-past ten on their second; by 11 o'clock the Canadians were up alongside. As the mists cleared and the sun burst through at about this time, a remarkable sight was seen in the wide spaces of the centre of the field: "... the whole Santerre plateau seen from the air was dotted with parties of infantry, field artillery, and tanks moving forward. Staff officers were galloping about, many riding horses in battle for the first time. . . . Indeed, at this stage there was more noise of movement than of firing, as the heavy batteries . . . were no longer in action; for the infantry had gone so far that it was no longer possible for them to shoot. . . . No enemy guns seemed to be firing and no co-ordinated defence was apparent. . . ." By 1.30 p.m. the main fighting was over. The Australians had occupied all their objectives, except on their extreme flanks where their neighbours were behind them; the Canadians had advanced almost eight miles.

It had been a sensational day but not devoid of hazards. By common consent the tanks had done marvels. Against German infantry and machine-guns they had proved irresistible, and countless infantry lives had been saved by their action. The German artillery, on the other hand, had not suffered the loss of morale that the year's high casualties had brought about in the infantry. They stuck to their guns, often shooting at tanks at point-blank range. Ten tanks of the 1st Battalion attacked Le Quesnel in the Canadian sector; nine were set on fire by direct hits from field guns at 70 yards. A line of 12 tanks, topping the crest of a rise that marked their starting line with the 5th Australian Division, had six knocked out immediately by field guns at a range of half a mile, another immediately afterwards, and three more shortly after that. Collaboration between the whippets and the cavalry, of which much had been expected, proved an illusion. On the other hand, the whippets themselves were most successful, outflanking batteries, supporting patrols, mopping up, and many of them experiencing adventures similar to, though it would scarcely be possible to equal, those of the legendary tank 'musical box.' The armoured cars of the 17th Battalion, once the long, straight Roman road that bisects the battlefield was cleared, plunged deep into the German back areas, shooting up infantry and transport and capturing a corps staff.

In the centre victory was complete. The Canadians captured 114 officers, 4,919 other ranks, 161 guns, and uncounted hundreds of machine-guns and mortars; their losses were about 3,500. The Australians captured 183 officers, 7,742 other ranks, 173 guns, and hundreds of smaller trophies. Their losses were under 3,000. Only on the flanks was there any setback. The III Corps, after a difficult day on the 7th, trying to win back its lost ground, spent a bad night against an alert enemy. There was much German shelling, particularly with gas, which caused many casualties. Surprise was out of the question; the enemy were as strong as the attackers; the ground, steep and well-wooded, was much more difficult than the smooth terrain of the centre. The main objective of the Corps was the Chipilly spur, thrusting its high promontory into the Somme which is here compelled to make a wide southward bend. Unless taken, this spur would prove a serious handicap to the left of the Australian advance; but to take it proved beyond the powers of the 58th Division. III Corps was not able to progress beyond its first objective, with the result that the advancing Australians were caught in enfilade by machine-guns and field artillery sited on the spur. They suffered their most serious casualties and their only failure at this point. When every allowance is made for the special conditions that applied to the III Corps front, there remains a contrast between the performance of these divisions and that of the Dominion troops so marked that a further explanation has to be sought. The British official historian makes this comment: "... there was not only a shortage of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, but the ranks of the infantry units had been filled up with young recruits from home. These convalescent divisions had not entered with great enthusiasm on the hard task of preparing a field of battle... the willing co-operation usually exhibited before an attack was absent." In other words, after four years of war, the British Army was showing signs of war-weariness that did not, so far, affect the soldiers of the younger nations who had spent less time on the Western Front.

Nor was this feeling confined to the British. In the French sector, where the going was very much easier, the absence of 'push' was even more marked. General Debeney's instructions to his Army had been vehement in the French manner: "... the attacks will be conducted with but one preoccupation, to achieve the greatest rapidity in a succession of forward bounds... Alignment is not to be sought; it is forbidden to wait for neighbouring divisions... the attacks will be pushed on and continued until night; from the very first day the troops must go 'very far'." This did not occur. Starting three-quarters of an hour after the Canadians, whose advance naturally eased their progress on the left, the French moved so deliberately that when the Canadian line halted, it was five hours before the French came up abreast of them. General Debeney was found by Sir Douglas Haig during the afternoon "almost in tears because three battalions of his Colonial infantry had bolted before a German machine-gun." Making all due allowance for Haig's habitual sardonic view of his allies, it is clear that the First French Army was not performing well. The French had shown great fire in their counter-attack at Soissons in July under Mangin. They were to show it again and again before the war ended. But Debeney was no Mangin, and the French Army of 1918 was not of the same calibre as the fine troops who had been squandered in 1915 and 1916.

But whatever deficiencies may have appeared in the French ranks and in the line divisions of the British Army, they were nothing to those exposed in the German Army. The German official Monograph on the battle sums up the day from the enemy's point of view: "As the sun set on the 8th August on the battlefield the

greatest defeat which the German Army had suffered since the beginning of the war was an accomplished fact. The position divisions between the Avre and the Somme which had been struck by the enemy attack were nearly completely annihilated. The troops in the front line north of the Somme had also suffered seriously, as also the reserve divisions thrown into the battle in the course of the day. The total loss of the formations employed in the Second Army area is estimated at 650 to 700 officers and 26,000 to 27,000 other ranks. More than 400 guns, besides a huge number of machine-guns, trench mortars, and other war material had been lost. . . . More than two-thirds of the total loss had surrendered as prisoners." Ludendorff wrote: "August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through . . . our losses had reached such proportions that the Supreme Command was faced with the necessity of having to disband a series of divisions. . . . 8th August made things clear for both army commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy."

The attack continued on the following day, but the initial impetus could not be regained. Only 145 tanks were fit for action; German reserves were arriving on the scene; many of the British troops were tired after their great exertions. Yet there is a sense of wasted opportunities on the 9th: the only notable gain of the day was the capture of the Chipilly spur by an American unit, the 131st Regiment, attached to III Corps. General Monash records his disappointment at the semi-defensive orders given to his Corps: "I should have welcomed an order to push on . . . in open warfare formation . . . the order stood, however. . . ." There can be little doubt that both on this day and the next the British Fourth Army found it difficult to make the adjustment to the new conditions of open warfare and movement created by their own success on the 8th. Rawlinson, not unnaturally, feared the now-familiar German tactics of retirement and counter-attack which had brought to nothing the success at Cambrai, and felt it necessary to prepare some defensive positions against such an eventuality. As for the French, the combined exhortations of Foch, Haig, and Debeney could not re-instil in their divisions the offensive spirit that so many failures had undermined. On 10th August the intervention of the French Third Army, on the right of the First, helped to pull that wing of the battle forward, but in general the advance that day was small. German resistance was stiffening and, worse still, the allies were now approaching the old battlefields of 1916 with their maze of trenches, their jungles of wire, and their concrete fortifications. This ground was wholly unsuitable even for heavy tanks, let alone the whippets and the cavalry. A change of plan was evidently required.

Once again it was Haig who, in effect, took strategic charge of the operations, just as it was he who had originated them far back in May. Foch, ardent and aggressive as ever, was all for pushing on, and indeed, issued instructions in that sense. But Haig had already seen that this course might be impossible, and had already begun preparations for a new blow on the front of the British Third Army. Now he extended these to the fronts of the First and Second Armies also. For a day Foch's persistence overbore Haig, who was constrained to continue his pressure on Rawlinson. But the latter, remembering no doubt the ordeal that his Army had gone through on these very battlefields in 1916, resisted the pressure strongly. The official historian informs us that he even said to Haig: "Who commands the British Army, you or Foch?" The slight advances and small captures of 10th August decided Haig. The following day he returned to his arguments against the Generalissimo's plans, and won Foch over to an agreement to switch the main operation northward from the front of the Fourth Army to that of the Third. It

was some days before Foch could bring himself to make this change of plan formal, but he generously acknowledged why he did so: "I definitely came around to the opinion of Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. . . ." And so the Army was spared a second Somme, but instead went on to a second victory at Albert ten days later.

This date, 11th August, was in its way as decisive as the 8th. German morale was now unmistakably waning and the infection was reaching the support divisions arriving on the battlefield. The German 38th Division, coming up, met "drunken Bavarians who shouted to the 94th Regiment: 'What do you war-prolongers want? If the enemy were only on the Rhine—the war would then be over!'" Other retreating troops shouted to the 263rd Reserve Regiment: "We thought that we had set the thing going, now you asses are corking up the hole again." Ludendorff, at a meeting of the High Command with the Kaiser on this day, reported "that the warlike spirit of some of the divisions left a good deal to be desired . . . when the Kaiser and Crown Prince suggested that too much had been asked of the troops, Ludendorff replied that the collapse of the Second Army on the 8th August could not be accounted for by the divisions being over-tired. He offered his resignation, but it was not accepted." It was at this same meeting, on 11th August, that the Kaiser uttered these words: "I see that we must strike a balance. We have nearly reached the limit of our powers of resistance. The war must be ended."

This was the victory. This was the fruit of all the courage, all the preparation, all the skill in planning, all the dash in battle. This cancelled out all the setbacks. This, at last, meant the justification of the sacrifices over the years. For what this meant was, as the official historian says, that "the collapse of Germany began not in the Navy, not in the Homeland, not in any of the sideshows, but on the Western Front in consequence of defeat in the field."

A SIGNAL OFFICER IN NORTH RUSSIA, 1918-1919—III

By BRIGADIER R. CHENEVIX TRENCH, C.B., O.B.E., M.C.

WINTER life in Archangel was no doubt in essentials much like that in other far northern cities, but it was farther north than Dawson in the Yukon, and a very cold place. Lord Ironside mentions 85 degrees of frost. Sunrise merged into sunset and an opal cloud of wood smoke hung over the city. The houses were built and fuelled against cold, and we suffered no real hardship. Few Russians left their houses unless business took them, and they grew more and more pasty and unwholesome looking, but communal life went on. Laundry women did their work kneeling by the margin of a hole in the river ice and keeping the water from freezing by the movement of their bare hands. Among these Russians who ventured abroad were the children, and I wrote, "The peasants and the children are the best people in Russia. The children are full of go and the small boys very plucky; they take the most appalling tosses on an ice run we have built, with the best heart in the world. They are very quick to learn, and if you could catch them young and keep them away from their worthless elders, you might do anything with them."

In truth, as touching the conduct of the war, we continued to find ourselves as exasperated by the Russians as they were puzzled by us. On the social side it was a different matter. They invited us into their houses and were considerate, delightful hosts, amusing and intelligent, our cultural betters, and, I wrote, "quite, quite futile." Out of genuine kindness of heart they showed a persistent, close interest in the private affairs of their guests. "Are you married?" asked my hostess once. "Yes, Madame, I am happy to say." "And how many children have you?" "None, Madame." "Ah," with genuine concern, "you must see about that when you get home." In a discussion on national traits, in which they were quite frank about themselves, an old lady said to me, "If I could be young again I should marry an Englishman, because Englishmen are true." She clearly had no doubts of her ability to have achieved this, if she had set her mind to it. More than one Russian woman contrived to do it before we left, in a despairing bid to escape from her dissolving world into security, and with little attempt to conceal her motive. I felt a little churlish in refusing all but a few invitations to Russian houses; it was because I dreaded the effect on my work of their endless parties, running into the early hours.

In our dealings with our other allies, both they and we would have been more than human if no tensions had developed. Dykes's batman, a Londoner and an old Regular, knew what he thought and expressed it with soldierly simplicity. "I don't 'old," he said, "with all these h'allies and h'aliens." Sometimes we thought that he spoke for us all. With the French, after four years of shared struggle and suffering, we knew where we stood; we had learned to put up with one another's ways and tradition had made each something of a national joke to the other. This tolerance survived the fact that they showed little stomach for our war at any time, saw no reason why they should fight at all after the armistice, and had finally to be withdrawn as useless, after a minor mutiny. When they saw an Englishman they would call, "Guerre finie"; we would laugh and say "How like the French."

With the American soldiers things did not, at first, go altogether smoothly. They had arrived untrained and in no condition to face an enemy in the field. We met as strangers, with no shared experience, and the ghost of the ancient grudge had not been wholly exorcised. Unlike their brothers who had made their name on the French battlefields, they had had no chance to prove themselves in the field, and were

left with the inevitable urge to self-assertion. If they were brash, we were snooty; we knew it, for we had often been told so, and our painful efforts to appear otherwise must have been trying indeed. But we wanted to like one another and each side was more than pleased, if a little surprised, to find how easy it was. The Engineers of the two armies, in particular, discovered a mutual regard, which grew into a strong comradeship, and their officers shared a mess in Archangel. In my encounters with United States troops of all arms I met with nothing but friendly co-operation and warm hospitality. Above all, they meant business and became tough, seasoned soldiers as they gained experience.

Christmas came and brought its time-honoured army observance and its homesickness. There had been for generations a flourishing British commercial community in Archangel, and so there was an English church where we could worship. The Russians observed the holiday on 7th January, for their Church followed the old calendar, but for them it was far outshone as a festival by Easter Day with its heart lifting greeting in mouth of friend and stranger, "Christ is risen," and the triumphant reply, "He is risen indeed."

I wanted, before the trails broke up in the thaw, to tour the forward areas again, to see how Signals had fared through the winter and to discuss their needs and those of the commanders whom they served. On 19th February I set out, and returned to Archangel five weeks later after covering 900 miles. My orderly and I shared a single sleigh and had to forgo the mutual protection provided by a convoy, even of only two or three, in the event of a chance meeting with the enemy. The risk was slight enough, but it existed and, of course, it cut both ways. The C.-in-C., with two sleighs in his party, had such an encounter. There were two sleighs also in the enemy party. The occupant of one was killed. The other, in Lord Ironside's words, "got away"; he was fortunate.

Shenkursk had been lost since I was there in December. It was an important town and had been occupied in the original southward advance largely for political reasons, but it was so far forward as to be tactically a hostage to fortune. On 19th January a strong enveloping attack began, and the garrison was only extricated after seven days of hard fighting, most of it in darkness. The retreat was most ably conducted by Major Graham, and those who knew him were glad when he was promoted to the command of the Dvina Force after Brigadier-General Finlayson had had to go home, a sick man. Both of them, like the C.-in-C., were Gunners.

In the Dvina Force area there was a new enterprise to look at, an up-country signal school set up to deal with the growing needs and to ease the strain on the school in Archangel. It was commanded by Captain Donald Hancock, and I breathed that unmistakable air of flourishing vitality. Up the river I learned something of the winter fighting. It was not on a large scale, but the British infantry were neither young nor fit for active operations to start with, and to men from the crowded Western front, all was menacingly strange and unfamiliar. Block houses had been built to form defended posts, and in these the men had spent the winter. They had great defensive strength. The attacker had to plough through snow, which hid the wire until it was actually encountered, and every movement was hampered by the cold and by his heavy clothing. The posts were concealed from observation by a screen of trees, through which radiating lanes were cleared to give a field of fire. Ranges were given by marks on trees. Inside was warmth and food, and the men handled their arms without restriction. With alert and stout-hearted defenders the posts were, in fact, as nearly impregnable to infantry attack as any defence can be.

Against artillery or mortars it was a different matter, but in the rare instances when the enemy could bring these with him through the forest, the absence of daylight made it impossible for him to observe their fire effectively.

None the less the long darkness, the midday twilight, the silence, and the loneliness weighed on our men. Patrolling was eerie. Encounters in the open with the Russians in their white smocks were a form of fighting unfamiliar to them; they knew the holocausts of the Somme and Passchendaele, but not this war in which a wounded man died in the cold if he were left lying for 15 minutes. They never shamed their kind, but as a weapon in the hand of a commander they had lost their cutting edge, as other good men have done. As always, everything depended on the officers; ours had been selected when the issue of the war hung in the balance and we could not expect to have for our sideshow the pick of the British army; nor did we.

Signals were more fortunate. Besides being young and fit, and most of them new to the war, they had the stimulus of their duty at the centre of affairs, and I found them in good heart, although on the Dvina front I sensed, even in Signals, some loss of resilience. The term 'the northern horrors' was invented. Some sought to hold them off by whisky, and I marvelled, not for the first time, how men who must have that solace contrive to get it in times of the greatest scarcity when their less single minded fellows go without. I saw how it could rot a good man, who might never be drunk; and I was to learn later how vain it is to give such a one a second chance.

There were some interesting minor technical points. Field cable laid across the Dvina before it froze, and weighted to the bottom, worked faultlessly through the winter. Bare wire laid on the surface, whether of snow, ice, or frozen soil, worked in the total absence of moisture as well as if it had been raised on poles. By the same token there could be no earth faults. This appeared to simplify the work of patrolling and line maintenance, and standards were allowed to drop, but it was paid for when the thaw came. Then every ground cable, now lying in mud after the wear and tear of winter, every bare overhead wire in contact with dripping boughs, leaked to earth throughout its length.

We had our winter successes. At Morjegorskaia, a post on the west bank of the Dvina 30 miles below Beresnik, there was based a mixed column under Lieut.-Colonel Carroll, of the Norfolks, for the protection of the Lines of Communication. When I reached them in late February they were justifiably set up. Co-operating with a force under Major Gilmore, of the U.S. army, from Shred Makengra, the extreme eastward position of Vologda Force, they had defeated heavily some strong attacks, designed to cut off the Dvina Force. I was particularly pleased because the Russian signal section, newly provided by the Signal School, had done very well.

It was on the journey from Pinega to Archangel that I made acquaintance with reindeer, and some extracts from a letter run, "Got in at 4 a.m. today and had some difficulty in finding the rest house. I came part of the way behind a team of four reindeer, driven by a Samoyed. He's like an Eskimo on a Christmas card, four foot six high and the same broad, and there are lots of them with their reindeer teams here in the winter. But they don't go south of Archangel (I'm east of it) and can only stick the mildness of these parts in the winter. Other times they disappear into the north in search of a decent temperature. Reindeer are awfully nice little beasts and pull a very light sleigh at a good six or seven miles an hour: it's not very comfortable, because the sleigh is just a light framework of wood and sinew, and there's very little room to sit."

This leads me to a digression. In the early years of the century the junior officer spent much of his considerable energy in frivolous pursuits. His pay, unless of course he was a Royal Engineer, was I think 5s. 3d. a day, and the importance of being earnest had not cast its shadow over his life. In those days, then, a brother subaltern and I, with the help of the Badminton Library and the enthusiastic co-operation of the soldiers who turned out the King's horses for us, had taught ourselves to drive a four-in-hand, and the more difficult tandem. Save for a rare and apologetic motor car, the English roads were ours, to share with other travellers by horse or bicycle, or afoot. We were perhaps a little pleased with ourselves, but that was before I had been driven by a Samoyed behind a team of four reindeer. Each beast had a single trace, fixed to a strap round his neck and coming away between his legs. The four traces were made off to the same point on the sleigh, a kind of stemhead. The team ran four abreast, and one wore a head collar from which a single thong led back to the driver's hand. With no bits, no reins, no pole or shafts, no 'patent brake,' he kept his team on its course and kept his sleigh from overrunning it on the downward slopes.

On 17th March there were 56 degrees of frost. The 21st, the spring equinox, found us towards nightfall driving over a treeless plain. Punctually at six o'clock the sun cut the horizon. All day he had shone through a slight haze, a pale disc giving light without warmth; it was bitterly cold and I thought, "Will this winter never end?" Perhaps it had preyed on the vitality of us all.

To set against Colonel Carroll's successes, Bolshee Ozerkee, a post to the west of the railway manned by French troops, was lost on 17th March. This was a shock to us all; the surprise was absolute and the enemy's success complete and well deserved. The place was only 16 miles from Vologda Force headquarters, and it was fortunate that the enemy failed to exploit the local consternation and drive on to that centre. Eight days later it was recaptured by the simple tactical expedient of destroying the defences by howitzer fire. Soon after this Brigadier-General Turner, newly arrived from England, was posted to command Vologda Force; the Brigade Major was Major Hudson, V.C., of the Sherwood Foresters, and I wrote after a visit there, "It is a very good thing to have a good British command on the railway at last, and the difference to everything is immense."

Wilson, my assistant, had held the office in my absence. I now sent him off on a mission to Vologda Force, to give him experience and a change from his chair. He found both. Nearing Bolshee Ozerkee he drove into the enemy round a corner of the trail. He could not lift a finger to help himself, and was picked out of his sleigh like a winkle and carried off to Moscow. There were a few British soldiers there who had been captured earlier, and the Bolsheviks, who wanted to propose some exchanges, told them to name one of their number to take a message to General Ironside. They unanimously chose Wilson, the only officer. This, their captors patiently explained to them, betrayed a lamentable lack of class spirit, but they would have no one else, and in the middle of April he turned up under escort on the railway front. He saw the C-in-C., who wrote afterwards that he appeared, "dazed and frightened of saying much, for fear of reprisals." Whom this young officer was afraid of is, as they say, anybody's guess.

He had promised to return; and it is hard to blame a young, hastily trained, war-time soldier for forgetting, if he had ever known, that a prisoner-of-war must not give his parole because it is his duty to escape if he can. But he had passed his word and there was no remedy; back he must go when his message had been delivered.

His treatment so far had not been too bad, but when in time he reached home after the war he wrote to me of his later experience and described the privation and the crowded filth in which the British prisoners had been kept, men and women together. They owed their lives, he said, to the unceasing intervention of the English chaplain in Moscow, Mr. North, who spoke Russian and had gained the respect of the authorities by his complete fearlessness. He had, apparently, hit on a reproach that cut the Bolsheviks to the quick: that they were behaving like uncultured barbarians.

Soon after I had left the railway front an almost unbelievable thing happened there. A British battalion, fresh from home and newly arrived by sleigh from Murmansk, by the track through Soroka and Onega, refused to fall in. The ring-leaders were two sergeants of a department, who had served safely at home through the war with Germany and found themselves, after it was over, transferred to the infantry and sent to fight in Russia. The situation was firmly dealt with by the commanding officer, who was new to the battalion; the two sergeants were tried by court martial in Archangel and received sentence of death, which was commuted to imprisonment for life. There was no more trouble; the men were young, ignorant, and impressionable; they were deeply ashamed after the incident; the C.-in-C. addressed them and they went up to the front and did well. The worst effect was the revelation that such a thing could happen with British troops.

There was one more visit to be paid while the frost still held, and I went on 11th April to Kholmogori, on the west bank of the Dvina a day's journey from Archangel, where the newly-formed 4th North Russian Regiment was stationed. I wanted to see how its signal unit was shaping, and I found good cause to congratulate the Signal School. It was on this visit that I was in an infantry company headquarters when the rum issue arrived, provided like everything else by the British. All the officers were there. The ration looked already very small for 200 men, but no one made any comment; each officer filled his water-bottle and the company sergeant-major took the rest. With typical hospitality they offered to fill mine.

The Bolsheviks launched a last offensive while movement was still possible on the Dvina front near the end of April. It was signalled by a mutiny in one of our Russian battalions in which 300 men went over to the enemy after murdering seven of their officers. They were fired on without compunction by their own comrades, who stood fast, and the attack was held, mainly by Russian troops, after three days' fighting. The ground lost was later retaken by Russians. There was no doubt that they were at last making progress and gaining confidence. This was due largely to the arrival in February of a new head of the Russian Provisional Government with the unlikely name of General Miller. He injected energy into his countrymen and was of a wholly different calibre from his predecessor, of whom I wrote home, "That old fraud Tchaikovsky has gone."

As the spring advanced the C.-in-C. told us the broad future policy and the outline of his plans. The men of the original Elope force had played their part; they were, except the few Regulars, to be relieved and sent home. The relieving troops would comprise two self-contained brigade groups of selected volunteers, a mobile force of real hitting power. With these and units of the new Russian army he would advance up the Dvina to Kotlas, about 100 miles from our forward positions. From Kotlas a branch line ran to the trans-Siberian railway at Viatka, about 250 miles to the south-east. It was not known how far Admiral Kolchak had reached, but in December he had been within 150 miles of Viatka. On 22nd May, the C.-in-C. heard from the War Office that Kolchak was confident of reaching that place and then sending a

detachment north-west to make contact with us at Kotlas. At Kotlas, then, we were to meet Admiral Kolchak's advanced troops and put the two Russian armies in touch with one another. Further than that could not be planned. The main artillery support for the advance up the river would be provided by craft of the Royal Navy. G.H.Q. would move up to Beresnik.

Under the stimulant of offensive mobile operations to come we plunged into the activity of preparation. Manpower, as usual, was my main problem. Each brigade would bring its own signal company for its own needs, but I should need more men for the extended commitments of G.H.Q. and the lines of communication, as well as replacements for those sent home. The former need could be calculated, and I had another bout of working out establishments. For the men sent home I could only ask that they should be replaced before they left.

For G.H.Q. up the river I planned to have a floating signal centre that could accompany any move south from Beresnik, and I was able to lay hands on a 300-ton wooden barge. This was fitted with signal office equipment, telegraph instruments, switchboard, wireless station, workshop, charging plant, stores, and accommodation. Staff Sergeant Nield and his men spent themselves to have it ready in time and to guard it against all comers. Hard words were said about it later, when "Q" Branch of the staff came to make plans for the move up river, but the painful incident has no place here. The barge was mine and it was the apple of my eye. Among the preparations were experiments with field cable laid in the river bed from a launch, to use as the main signal artery of the advance. A method was evolved, in which the cable was weighted to the bottom throughout and marked with a buoy at every two mile joint. This promised well and would, I hoped, suffer less interruption than any line ashore.

As summer advanced and daylight lengthened until sunset merged into sunrise, the earth never cooled and the heat mounted daily in unbroken sunshine. I saw a swallowtail butterfly. Up the river the heat was as great, but without the exhausting humidity, and I enjoyed my steamer trips to the forward areas, where there was much to be done. This included pleasant hours in gunboats and monitors, discussing questions of communication for fire support and signals liaison in general. The river flotilla was commanded by Captain Altham, R.N. Seven years later I was to meet him again, when he was Secretary of the Royal United Service Institution and I gave a lecture there. The trip took three days up and two down. After one visit I returned in a boat belonging to the Russian staff, and the C.O., a Colonel Prince Morousy, with great kindness invited me to share his cabin. I wrote, "He is a very good officer, I believe, and quite straight, but with that curious Russian kink of impracticability. He is a monarchist and thinks he is fighting to restore the Tsardom." I was deeply sorry for him, but I could not think our war was about that.

As the Russian army grew it took over sectors of defence, including the Pinega and the railway fronts, and their regimental signal units, children of the original signal school and its off-shoots, began to find their feet in the field. I took a godfather's pride in them all and it was fed by golden reports of how well they acquitted themselves. A Russian, Colonel Reinbot, was appointed as their future chief of signals. I gradually handed over to him responsibility for all Russian signal training and I find in another letter, "My tame Russian is getting on quite well, but to make him take responsibility is like coaxing a dog to swim. I want to push him over the edge." I had the good fortune to receive at this time a reinforcement officer, Captain Ozanne of the Royal Warwicks, who had learnt Russian as a prisoner-of-war in Germany and

had formerly been a battalion signalling officer. I sent him off to the Russian General Staff as my liaison officer and he filled the post admirably.

I had before this been equally fortunate in my liaison officer with the civil telegraph department, Captain Garrett. His Christian name was Sidney and his father's Thomas, and he was known throughout the department, in the Russian style, as Sidney Thomvitch, Sidney son of Thomas. This was a tribute that I never heard of any other Englishman winning. Of the civil Director himself, I wrote that he was "the best of the crowd, and runs a good show." I could not have had a more loyal or helpful co-operator. In addition to providing the best recruits for the new signal companies he had, by May, 1919, put at our disposal about 1,200 miles of permanent telegraph line, either specially built or taken over on existing routes. On their Christmas Day I dined with his family, an outsider made welcome in a large, merry, and affectionate circle.

The two new brigades, each of two battalions with supporting troops, came out in June and made an immense impression on the Archangel Russians, as well they might. The first to arrive was the 238th, mostly of young soldiers, under Brigadier-General Grogan; the second was the 250th, mostly seasoned troops, under Brigadier-General Sadleir-Jackson. Each had a strong signal company, that for the 238th under Captain J. A. Weston of the East Lancashires, that for the 250th under Captain W. B. Whishaw, R.E. No two good soldiers could be in stronger contrast than the brigade commanders. Grogan was very quiet, apparently diffident, wholly without fireworks; but he held the Victoria Cross. Sadleir-Jackson was dynamic, explosive and eye-filling, with a dramatic, Elizabethan quality, barbered and manicured, gallant and thrusting, driven by a daemon of restless energy. The Victorians had a word for it; he was dashing. He was essentially a fighter, and if his countrymen sometimes smiled at his ways, we may be sure that the enemy did not. I had first known him seven years before at Aldershot where, among a number of officers of other arms, he had been seconded to R.E. Signals. He came to us from the 9th Lancers. Our next meeting had been in France in 1917, when I took over from him the Signals of the Cavalry Corps. He had found the technical path too strait and was going off to command a battalion. His seniors in the Royal Engineers faced their loss with, I think, something of relief.

On 15th June the C-in-C. held a conference to explain his tactical plans for the summer in more detail. G.H.Q. was to move early in July to Beresnik, in the Dvina Force area, for the advance on Kotlas, and Dvina Force headquarters were to move forward to Troitsa, on the east bank about 30 miles farther on. My main energies were bent on preparing for this. A good deal of re-organization was involved, which included the creation of a new signal company to serve G.H.Q. at Beresnik, and I ran into considerable trouble. The signal units of the new brigades, of magnificent material, had had no company training and lacked experience of any conditions other than those of trench warfare. They had much to learn and found this difficult to realize; had they not come out to rescue us? An extract from my record for 23rd June runs, "Reached Beresnik. Signals here altogether bad. Taking over by Grogan's Brigade Signals was not controlled in any way and resulted in chaos," and later, "Communication from G.H.Q. Beresnik to front is very bad. This is the inevitable result of changing the whole Signals personnel on the Dvina *en bloc* and putting in new companies with no company training." The most serious blow of all was a telegram from the War Office on 19th June to say that not only would my old hands not be replaced before they left; they would not be replaced at all.

My first reaction was indignation on their behalf ; as they were not to be replaced they could not be released. The C.-in-C. disabused me ; he told me that all the old hands who wished to go must be sent home, and that I must do without them. This started a creeping paralysis, which grew with cumulative effect as manpower wasted. The signal system behind the fighting brigades began to die on its feet, and I thought it would be a close run thing between the end of the campaign and the collapse of signal communications, but I failed to impress the C.-in-C. or the General Staff with my misgivings. In July I had to reduce the base and L. of C. telegraph services to 16 hours daily, for want of men to staff three reliefs. Later on the base telephone system was cut down by half for want of operators to work the exchanges. In this matter of telephones, no signal officer has ever been able to satisfy the administrative departments ; like the daughters of the horse leech they cry, " give, give." Those in and around Archangel were no exception and now, with new demands on them to meet new needs at the front, they were pressing me for more telephones. Instead, as I have said, I cut them by a half. We were alike the victims of circumstance, but this reflection did not help them. The time came when detachments of field wireless stations were reduced from three operators with a technician for maintenance, under a junior non-commissioned officer, to one operator who could handle messages, with two regimental signallers to keep listening watch while he slept. When a station broke down, it remained out of action, perhaps for days, until a tradesman could reach it for repairs. There were soon too few linemen left for maintenance duties.

In all this I was cheered and my heart warmed by one small incident. When my chief clerk was asked, with the others, whether he wished to avail himself of his right to go home, he said, " I'll volunteer to stay on till November if the Colonel is staying on, but I can't have a new C.S.O. coming out and making a mess of things." I had sent Rorke home, but not soon enough ; not, in fact, until the latter half of June. He was one of the casualties of the winter, and I had been slow to recognize it, for he had been my right hand man and we had been through much together. He was succeeded by Major W. G. St. L. Montague, who came in for a difficult inheritance.

(To be continued)

THOUGHTS ON FOOT DRILL

By MAJOR ROBIN TUKE

THAT summer's evening the stands around the parade ground were packed with spectators. It was almost dark when the searchlights in the skeleton steel tower were switched on. The great doors in the drill shed, transformed now into the battlemented walls of a medieval castle, swung wide and the magnificent band and drums of the Royal Marines broke into a lively air as it strutted into the arena with pomp and assurance to open the Tattoo. Simultaneously, from behind the wall, a company of troops wheeled onto the stage from a flank. As the music swelled and the drums throbbed, and the company of Royal Marines swung across the scene with rifles at the slope, left arms swinging in perfect unison no higher than the belt, and boots crunching crisply on the tarmac, the hearts of many old soldiers amongst the audience beat a little faster and their chests swelled. Undoubtedly the thoughts of many were carried back over the distant past when they too proudly marched like that in the regiments of their choice. Critically they surveyed the evolutions with unstinted admiration and delight.

The band and drums halt in the centre of the square while the troops wheel into position in front of them. Presently the music stops. A few paces later the marching column halts with a slam. A moment later it pivots to its front, a hundred feet flicking into position. After a brief pause, a hundred rifles move like one to the order. With a click of feet the company stands at ease.

"Gad!", gasped an old soldier beside me, "that's the drill we did at Sandhurst. It is, sir, I assure you," he said, turning to me with a happy grin. "Haven't seen anything like it for years."

"I agree, I agree," I replied, equally thrilled. "It's perfect. None of that high kicking stamping stuff. Er—when were you at Sandhurst, sir?"

"Nineteen-fourteen. B Company."

"Fancy! That was my time, too. H Company. Old Building, you know. More traditional we always thought."

"Rot. Didn't make any difference," he laughed. "But, by Gad, we could drill there. Best in the world, I reckon; 'bout the only thing we learned in our time, eh? To be jolly good private soldiers. It's a proper treat to see the old drill again. Splendid fellows, Royal Marines. Immutable, that's the word. Immutable—like our pensions, eh?" he chortled.

A sharp word of command interrupted our discourse and the troops sprang to attention. The band struck up, the troops moved off, and the next event was ready to come on. In the thrill and interest of the Tattoo we had no opportunity to resume our discussion.

* * *

Like many things, drill during the last half-century has almost imperceptibly changed, except in the Royal Marines; and even there they fall in in three ranks and no longer form fours. If one reaches back another 50 years you are in the Crimea and Mutiny era where the drill had not changed much from Peninsula days and was very different from anything within living memory.

War is the father of change. Armies are trained in peacetime in accordance with doctrine laid down in text books. Often the first battle blows the doctrine

sky high and the new armies are trained on pamphlets which pour out with increasing momentum as the war proceeds, and usually say more diffusely exactly the same as the rejected manuals with a few unimportant alterations. The same happens with drill. Very soon the little red book is out of date.

Returning from France with a 'blighty' one early in the Kaiser's war, like many other young men in any war, I visited my old school. It was rather pleasant to do so. Masters whom one formerly feared beam benevolently on the returned warrior. Boys who were small when one left crowd round the 'hero' and lionize him. And, of course, the Corps has to be visited (they call it something else now).

"Can you tell us about the kick-step?" asks an earnest master, an O.T.C. officer.

"Never did 'ear such rubbidge, sir," grumbles the sergeant-major, an old timer of Boer War vintage.

"Kick-step?" I repeated, blankly. "Never heard of it. Hasn't got out to France yet."

Another embryo 'hero,' just out of Sandhurst, explains it. "It's quite the thing now," he says. "Everybody's doing it."

Victory, it seemed, hinged on the mastery of this new quirk.

A year passed, which included the carnage of the Somme, and another 'blighty' one for this young officer, who was lucky. Whilst licking his wounds he was appointed an instructor at an Officer Cadet Battalion (O.C.T.U. in the last war) situated in a remote country house in Devon, where pheasants clattered up into surrounding trees at dusk and pigeons cooed their matins. The morning papers were the only link with war, though ships were being torpedoed in the Channel only a few miles away.

Regimental-Sergeant-Major Colley, Coldstream Guards, lost an arm when a corporal in Flanders but had been fitted with a very effective substitute. Like a ramrod he stood on parade, his pace-stick tucked under his dummy arm. He had the eye of a hawk and a voice that carried like thunder rolling round Dartmoor tors. It was the fashion in those days in the Brigade of Guards to emit the executive word of command with a deep and most effective choking sound which ended with a kind of gasp, like 'Aah!' Sergeant-Major Shun-ah, the cadets called Mr. Colley.

A familiar sound on the parade ground was: "Stand still-ah, that cadet-ah!"

He was a splendid R.S.M. who soon turned a rather shambling company of new cadets, most of whom had just arrived from the B.E.F., into a body worthy of a Buckingham Palace guard.

Like many superb drill instructors, he had his foibles. On parade he leaned slightly forward, chest thrown out, and as he gave a command his whole body quivered with verve and electric magnetism with which he inspired the cadets, who respected but adored him.

"Close up, those cadet-ahs," he would bellow as they straggled a little in file. "Like a lot of camels-ah, wandering across a desert-ah!"

The impelling executive word of command of those days seems to have vanished and is now replaced by an agonized falsetto scream. Has this, too, come from the 'Brigade,' where amongst giants it seems very incongruous; or has it crept in from the W.R.A.C., who are very good at drill and throw their bosoms into it with a will?

Periodically sergeants were sent up from the O.C.B. to attend a drill course at Chelsea Barracks, and when a sergeant returned, smart as paint, an eager throng of non-commissioned officers would surround him to learn what new movement had been introduced, and never a time passed without something new. Indeed, as the war progressed on its bloody course and the 'lost generation' paid its toll, the ramifications of the parade ground grew to bewildering complexities, which were carried forward into the years following victory.

After the war a battalion in Ireland was blessed with a Commanding Officer, who had won a D.S.O. in the Boer War and a great many other decorations in France, and was moreover a character, a 'card.' Like a centaur, seated on his thoroughbred charger, which had been through the war with him, he took the battalion in drill one morning. Without a preliminary hint to anyone he suddenly announced that the battalion would form square and prepare to repel attack. As though this was quite a usual practice the astonished battalion formed square, and the front rank assumed the kneeling position whilst the Colonel and the Adjutant took position within the square.

"Fix bayonets!" he ordered; and somehow everybody did, and the officers drew their swords. Probably Wellington might have thought the evolution required more practice, but the Colonel chuckled.

"Splendid," he commented. "Splendid! Hasn't been done since Tel-el-Kebir." And that, as every historian knows, was 'way back in the 'eighties', before even Sir Winston had joined. Probably it has never been done since, and certainly not in Ireland, for at that time we were involved in the 'troubles.' The Sinn Feiners never fought like Fuzzy-Wuzzies. They had their own more cunning tactics.

In stations like Gibraltar, where tactical training was necessarily restricted to company level, the complicated drill of those post-war days fulfilled a useful function. It gave everybody something to think about and made a battalion very smart. One might have thought that the battalion would have been weak in the field, yet when at short notice two battalions from the garrison were ordered to Egypt and subsequently took part in divisional training in the Moquatta Hills, outside Cairo, the Corps Commander commended the Gibraltar garrison troops for their tactical fitness.

In the days before the great development of motor traffic on the roads, an infantry column of battalion or brigade strength could proceed in a laborious and leisurely manner at the rate of three miles an hour in column of fours towards its destination. To cover 15 miles was a Roman day's march. Twenty miles was an effort only achieved by hardened troops. Twenty-five miles was an athletic achievement. Yet those who are old enough to have taken part in those slow processions will recall with pleasure and pride many long treks they have accomplished in peace and war. There was something inspiring in stepping it out along the highway, shoulder to shoulder, mile after mile, carrying a heavy pack and a rifle—or, if an officer, plugging along with a stout ash stick as an aid. Soon the column would break into song, or the drums and fifes would pipe up a series of well-known airs. Or best of all, in a Highland regiment the pipes would drone and skirl and swing the column along with stirring barbaric sounds. Kipling caught the spirit of it many years ago with his "regiment a-comin' down the Grand Trunk Road."

When Mr. Hore-Belisha was Secretary of State for War the change came. It had to. Troops in column of fours took up too much room on a road. In future

they would march in threes. Many 'postures which require practice,' as the War Secretary expounded in the House, were to be abolished. Drill was simplified. No longer would troops sing on the march :

" At the 'alt on the left form platoon (twice)
If the odd numbers don't mark time two paces
'Ow the 'ell can the rest form platoon ? "

It died as suddenly as a later ditty, " We'll hang up the washing on the Siegfried Line," when we got hung up instead. Indeed, singing on the march almost died out of the Army. The threat of air attack stopped it. How can you sing when slinking along a gutter in single file and one eye lifted skywards ?

Three years later came Hitler's war, and drill came into its own again. Thousands of raw recruits were stamping about parade grounds and cursing the weight of their creaking ammunition boots. With fewer 'postures to practise' than formerly they came on at a spanking pace and were soon ready to learn the more interesting field work and their future job on a battlefield.

After Dunkirk, a bewildering number of minor tactical notions were introduced to the Army by ex-anarchists, revolutionaries, cranks, and anyone else who thought he could pose as a kind of tough guy. Soon most of these strange nostrums were discarded, but for some time the Army at home was backward tactically. On exercises, platoons and companies often committed obvious tactical errors which would have meant massacre in battle.

Battle drill changed all that. It was invented, so it was said at the time, by Field-Marshal Lord Alexander. It was battle training by numbers. Every man in a section knew what he had to do. Every section in a platoon had its role cut and dried at a word of command. A platoon came under fire. " Left flanking ! " shouted the platoon commander, and the platoon deployed correctly and stalked the enemy, every man knowing where he fitted into the plan.

Now the nuclear threat has outmoded the pattern of former recent great battles, it seems that infantry in future will fight in dispersed groups. This calls for the exercise of increased initiative, better fieldcraft and scoutcraft than ever before. That is why, no doubt, one sees the Army now moving across country in small packets and learning to live like first-class Boy Scouts, though you will not be very popular if you tell them that ! Towards the end of the 19th century Lord Baden-Powell, when commanding his regiment in India, trained his men on precisely those lines. He emphasised the importance of self-reliance, initiative, 'stickability,' and fieldcraft. He was 70 years before his time.

Undoubtedly, successful practice of this Commando type of warfare rests more than ever on a high standard of discipline. As in the past, this is accomplished by a high standard of drill, and naturally with this goes pride in immaculate turnout. From what one sees of the Army nowadays the standard in this respect is as high as ever, and the level of intelligence probably higher, though a more unsoldierlike headpiece than a beret it would be hard to find. We have a right to be proud of our modern Army, but if a veteran long on the shelf may express a wish, it is that the exaggerated drill, the swinging of arms almost above the head, the accentuated stamping of feet, and similar antics, should be abolished. In short, that drill should revert to the 1914 pattern—and that, you will remember, was where we came in.

NAVY NOTES

H.M. THE QUEEN

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—Admiral Sir William W. Davis, K.C.B., D.S.O., has been appointed First and Principal Naval Aide-de-Camp to The Queen to date 30th April, 1959, in succession to Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Captain W. C. Shepherd, R.D., R.N.R., has been appointed a Royal Naval Reserve Aide-de-Camp to The Queen from 29th April, 1959, in succession to Captain R. V. E. Case, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.D., R.N.R.

SUBMARINE COMMAND COLOUR.—The Queen, accompanied by the Duke of Edinburgh, presented the first Queen's Colour to H.M.S. *Dolphin* for the Submarine Command at Gosport on 8th June. Her Majesty was received by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selkirk, who was accompanied by other members of the Board and by the Flag Officer, Submarines, Rear-Admiral B. W. Taylor, D.S.C.

CANADIAN TOUR.—The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh left England by air on 18th June for a tour of Canada until 1st August. The Royal yacht *Britannia* had left Portsmouth on 6th June for Newfoundland, where they embarked at Sept Isles on 20th June. The main event of the tour, the official opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway by The Queen and President Eisenhower, took place on 26th June.

DUKE OF EDINBURGH

As Captain-General of the Royal Marines, the Duke of Edinburgh on 14th May accepted the Freedom of the City of Portsmouth on behalf of the Corps at a ceremony at Eastney Barracks. The Royal Marines afterwards marched through the streets of Portsmouth with Colours flying, drums beating, and bayonets fixed, and the Duke took the salute as they passed the recently restored Guildhall at noon.

Rear-Admiral C. D. Bonham-Carter, C.B., has been appointed as Treasurer to His Royal Highness in succession to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Browning, and began his duties in May.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following were included in The Queen's Birthday Honours List :—

G.C.B.—Admiral Sir William W. Davis, K.C.B., D.S.O.

K.C.B.—Vice-Admiral Norman E. Dalton, C.B., O.B.E. ; Vice-Admiral Harry P. Koelle, C.B.

C.B.—Rear-Admiral C. D. Bonham-Carter ; Rear-Admiral N. E. H. Clarke ; Rear-Admiral G. C. de Jersey ; Rear-Admiral R. A. Ewing, D.S.C. ; Rear-Admiral W. Evershed, D.S.O. ; Rear-Admiral N. S. Henderson, O.B.E. ; Rear-Admiral J. K. Highton, C.B.E. ; Rear-Admiral H. C. N. Rolfe ; Rear-Admiral A. J. Tyndale-Biscoe, O.B.E. ; Rear-Admiral J. H. Unwin, D.S.C.

K.C.M.G.—Vice-Admiral Sir Peveril B. R. W. William-Powlett, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Governor of Southern Rhodesia.

K.B.E.—Vice-Admiral John G. T. Inglis, C.B., O.B.E. ; Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Thistleton-Smith, C.B., G.M. ; Rear-Admiral Anthony C. C. Miers, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.

BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

The Queen has been pleased, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, bearing date the 1st day of May, 1959, to appoint the following to be Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom :—

Group Captain the Right Hon. George Nigel, Earl of Selkirk, O.B.E., A.F.C.

Admiral Sir Charles E. Lambe, G.C.B., C.V.O.

Vice-Admiral Douglas E. Holland-Martin, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C.
 Admiral Sir J. Peter L. Reid, K.C.B., C.V.O.
 Rear-Admiral Nicholas A. Copeman, D.S.C.
 Admiral Sir Caspar John, K.C.B.
 Vice-Admiral Laurence G. Durlacher, C.B., O.B.E., D.S.C.
 Wing Commander Charles I. Orr-Ewing, O.B.E.
 The Hon. Thomas G. D. Galbraith.
 Sir John G. Lang, G.C.B.

FLAG APPOINTMENTS

HOME FLEET FLOTILLAS.—Vice-Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden, Bt., C.B., to be Flag Officer, Flotillas, Home Fleet, in succession to Vice-Admiral R. H. Wright, C.B., D.S.C. (August, 1959).

DOCKYARDS.—Rear-Admiral R. T. Sandars, C.B., to be Director General of Dockyards and Maintenance, in succession to Rear-Admiral P. D. H. R. Pelly, C.B., D.S.O. (December, 1959).

PERSONAL SERVICES.—Rear-Admiral C. H. Hutchinson, D.S.O., O.B.E., to be Director-General of Personal Services and Officer Appointments, in succession to Rear-Admiral G. A. F. Norfolk, C.B., D.S.O. (July, 1959).

DEFENCE MINISTRY.—Captain R. V. Brockman, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E., for duty with Ministry of Defence on personal staff of Admiral of the Fleet the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, in the acting rank of Rear-Admiral.

MALTA.—Captain D. H. F. Hetherington, D.S.C., to be Flag Officer, Malta, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden, Bt., C.B., serving in the acting rank of Rear-Admiral (1st July, 1959).

CYPRUS.—With the ending of the Cyprus emergency there is no longer need for an officer of Flag rank to carry out the duties performed by the Flag Officer, Middle East. When the appointment of Rear-Admiral A. C. C. Miers, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., ended on 13th May, he was replaced by a Commodore, Cyprus. Captain D. H. R. Bromley, D.S.C., formerly serving on the staff of the Flag Officer, Middle East, has been appointed to the new post with the rank of Commodore.

RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., placed on the Retired List (30th April, 1959). Admiral Grantham on 8th June became Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Malta, in succession to General Sir Robert Laycock.

Vice-Admiral Sir Walter T. Couchman, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., O.B.E., promoted to Admiral (30th April, 1959).

Rear-Admiral J. P. W. Furse, C.B., O.B.E., placed on the Retired List (22nd April, 1959).

Rear-Admiral R. S. Foster-Brown, C.B., placed on the Retired List (22nd May, 1959).

Rear-Admiral J. Lee-Barber, C.B., D.S.O., placed on the Retired List (25th May, 1959).

Rear-Admiral R. S. Wellby, C.B., D.S.O., placed on the Retired List (1st June, 1959).

Rear-Admiral C. D. Bonham-Carter placed on the Retired List (10th June, 1959).

HALF-YEARLY LISTS

The following retirements and promotions were announced to date 7th July, 1959 :—

Retirements.—Vice-Admiral Sir Stephen H. Carlill, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.; Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony C. C. Miers, V.C., K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.

Promotions. To Rear-Admiral.—Captain R. M. Smeeton, M.B.E., A.D.C.; Captain R. E. Washbourn, D.S.O., O.B.E.; Captain A. R. Hezlet, D.S.O., D.S.C.; Captain J. B. Frewen; Captain (Acting Rear-Admiral) D. H. F. Hetherington, D.S.C.; Captain (Commodore) T. L. Eddison, D.S.C.; Captain C. B. Pratt, A.D.C.; Captain W. G. S. Tighe; Captain V. St. C. L. Magniac.

The following promotions were announced to date 30th June, 1959 :—

General List : Seaman Specialists—Commander to Captain.—C. R. K. Roe, D.S.C.; M. L. C. Crawford, D.S.C.; J. F. R. Dreyer; F. W. Hayden, D.S.C.; N. Dixon; I. S. McIntosh, D.S.O., M.B.E., D.S.C.; A. M. Power, M.B.E.; J. R. McKaig; E. H. Lee, D.S.C.; P. L. Langly-Smith; W. C. Simpson, O.B.E., D.S.C.; E. F. Gueritz, O.B.E., D.S.C.

General List : Engineer Specialists—Commander to Captain.—W. B. S. Milln; G. A. Hewett, D.S.C.; H. A. Kidd, D.S.O., D.S.C.; D. F. Butlin.

General List : Supply and Secretariat Specialists—Commander to Captain.—T. P. Gillespie, M.B.E. (Acting Captain); J. G. Stanning, C.B.E.

General List : Electrical Specialists—Commander to Captain.—M. J. Head; J. Shepherd.

Instructor Branch : Instructor Commander to Instructor Captain.—G. P. Britton.

Medical Branch : Surgeon Commander to Surgeon Captain.—E. B. Bradbury; P. G. Burgess, M.V.O.; F. W. Baskerville (Acting Surgeon Captain).

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

HALF-YEARLY PROMOTIONS.—The following have been made to date 30th June, 1959 :—

Seaman Branch : Commander to Captain.—E. G. Horsley Riddelsdell, R.D.; J. D'Oyly Green, R.D.; W. R. Morton Murdoch, D.S.C., V.R.D.; P. Sime, V.R.D.

Medical Branch : Surgeon Commander to Surgeon Captain.—A. D. Petro, V.R.D.

Supply and Secretariat Branch : Commander to Captain.—F. A. Kemmis Betty, O.B.E., V.R.D.; K. W. Vallat, R.D.

ROYAL MARINES

HALF-YEARLY PROMOTIONS.—The following have been made to date 30th June, 1959 :—

Lieutenant-Colonel to Colonel.—F. B. Clifford.

Major to Lieutenant-Colonel.—R. D. Crombie; J. T. O. Waters; I. S. Harrison.

APPOINTMENTS.—Lieutenant-Colonel (Acting Colonel Acting Brigadier) P. W. C. Hellings, D.S.O., M.C., appointed Commander, 3 Commando Brigade, R.M. (29th June, 1959).

Lieutenant-Colonel I. S. Harrison appointed to command 40 Commando, R.M. (29th June, 1959).

Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Crombie appointed to command 42 Commando, R.M. (11th May, 1959).

Major (Acting Lieutenant-Colonel) I. D. De'Ath, D.S.O., M.B.E., appointed to command Royal Marines Barracks, Plymouth (11th May, 1959).

CANADA

HALF-YEARLY PROMOTIONS.—The following were announced by the Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Navy, Ottawa, to be effective 1st July, 1959 :—

Executive Branch : Commander to Captain.—G. H. Hayes.

Engineering Branch : Commander to Captain.—J. Doherty, A. G. Bridgman.

Electrical Branch : Commander to Captain.—R. M. Battles.

Medical Branch : Surgeon Commander to Surgeon Captain.—M. Wellman, H. R. Ruttan.

Supply and Secretariat Branch : Commander to Captain.—F. D. Elcock.

Royal Canadian Navy (Reserve). Executive Branch : Commander to Captain.—G. A. Brown, J. R. H. Kirkpatrick.

AUSTRALIA

HALF-YEARLY PROMOTIONS.—The following were announced by the Australian Commonwealth Navy Board to date 30th June, 1959 :—

Seaman Specialists : Commander to Captain.—I. K. Purvis, D. C. Wells.

Engineer Specialists : Commander to Captain.—J. F. Bell.

Medical Branch : Surgeon Commander to Surgeon Captain.—R. M. Coplans (Acting Surgeon Captain).

NEW ZEALAND

HALF-YEARLY PROMOTION.—The following was announced by the New Zealand Navy Board to date 30th June, 1959 :—

Seaman Specialist : Commander to Captain.—F. N. F. Johnston, D.S.C.

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ARMY NOTES

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen, accompanied by the Duke of Edinburgh (Colonel, Welsh Guards) and the Duke of Gloucester (Colonel, Scots Guards), was present at The Queen's Birthday Parade on the Horse Guards Parade on 13th June.

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, Honorary Colonel, The Inns of Court Regiment, took the Salute at a Parade of the Regiment at the Inner Temple Gardens on 1st May.

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, Colonel-in-Chief, The 3rd East Anglian Regiment (16th/44th Foot), presented new Colours to the 1st Battalion at Warley Barracks, Brentwood, on 30th May.

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, Colonel-in-Chief, The King's Regiment (Manchester and Liverpool), presented new Colours to the 8th (Ardwick) and 9th Battalions, The Manchester Regiment, T.A., at Audenshaw Grammar School on 24th June.

The Duke of Edinburgh, as Colonel-in-Chief, presented The Queen's Colour, on behalf of Her Majesty, to The Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment (Berkshire and Wiltshire) at Newport Barracks, Isle of Wight, on 9th June.

The Princess Margaret, Colonel-in-Chief, The Royal Highland Fusiliers (Princess Margaret's Own Glasgow and Ayrshire Regiment), presented Colours to the Regiment at Glasgow on 12th May.

The Princess Margaret, Colonel-in-Chief, The Suffolk Regiment, visited The Cambridgeshire Regiment, T.A., on 21st June, and was present in Ely Cathedral on the occasion of the dedication and presentation to the Cathedral of the Roll of Honour of The Cambridgeshire Regiment.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments:—

TO BE AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE QUEEN.—Brigadier J. W. Tweedie, C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th June, 1959), vice Brigadier F. Stephens, D.S.O., retired.

TO BE HONORARY PHYSICIAN TO THE QUEEN.—Colonel W. R. M. Drew, C.B.E., M.B., F.R.C.P. (29th April, 1959), vice Major-General R. A. Bennett, C.B., M.D., F.R.C.P., retired.

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Army Service Corps, Major-General W. H. D. Ritchie, C.B., C.B.E. (19th June, 1959), vice Major-General H. M. Whitty, C.B., O.B.E.; of the Royal Army Dental Corps, Colonel J. B. Cowie, O.B.E., M.M., F.D.S. (8th May, 1959), vice Colonel B. Abbott, L.D.S.

TO BE COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.—Of The Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment (Berkshire and Wiltshire), on formation, Major-General B. A. Coad, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (9th June, 1959); of The West India Regiment, Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Lathbury, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E. (13th May, 1959).

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following were included in The Queen's Birthday Honours List:—

G.C.B.—General Sir Hugh C. Stockwell, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C. (General).

K.C.B.—Lieut.-General Sir Roger H. Bower, K.B.E., C.B.; Lieut.-General Joseph H. N. Poett, C.B., D.S.O.

C.B.—Major-General K. C. O. Bastyan, C.B.E.; Major-General H. A. Borradaile, D.S.O.; Major-General P. J. L. Capon, Q.H.P., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.P.H.; Major-General A. F. J. Elmslie, C.B.E.; Major-General R. E. Goodwin, C.B.E., D.S.O.;

Major-General G. Kellett, C.B.E.; Major-General R. E. Lloyd, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Major-General J. F. M. Macdonald, D.S.O., O.B.E.; Major-General G. R. D. Musson, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Major-General G. Peddie, D.S.O., M.B.E.

D.B.E.—Brigadier Mary K. R. Colvin, O.B.E., T.D., A.D.C. (Honorary), W.R.A.C. *R.R.C. (First Class)*.—Lieut.-Colonel Gwendolen M. Willoughby, Q.A.R.A.N.C.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to make the following appointment to the Royal Victorian Order, to be dated 15th June, 1959:—

K.C.V.O.—Major-General J. N. R. Moore, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

APPOINTMENTS

UNITED KINGDOM.—Colonel (Temporary Brigadier) W. A. G. Burns, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., appointed G.O.C. London District and Major-General Commanding the Household Brigade (August, 1959).

PROMOTIONS

Lieut.-General.—Major-General to be temporary Lieut.-General.—G. S. Thompson, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E. (1st June, 1959).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals:—R. H. Batten, C.B.E., D.S.O. (4th April, 1959); F. C. C. Graham, D.S.O. (12th April, 1959).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals.—C. I. H. Dunbar, C.B.E., D.S.O. (15th May, 1959); The Lord Thurlow, C.B.E., D.S.O. (15th May, 1959); A. P. W. Hope, C.B.E. (7th June, 1959).

RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General G. P. Gregson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (29th April, 1959); Major-General R. A. Bennett, C.B., Q.H.P., M.D., F.R.C.P. (Edin.) (29th April, 1959); Major-General F. D. Rome, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O. (18th May, 1959); Major-General J. R. C. Hamilton, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st June, 1959); Major-General T. P. D. Scott, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (12th June, 1959).

AIR NOTES

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the appointment of His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran to the Royal Air Force in the Honorary rank of Air Chief Marshal (5th May, 1959).

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—Group Captain A. D. Mitchell, D.F.C., A.F.C., is appointed Aide-de-Camp to The Queen in succession to Air Commodore H. E. C. Boxer, O.B.E., who relinquishes the appointment on promotion (9th June, 1959); Group Captain D. G. Smallwood, D.S.O., M.B.E., D.F.C., is appointed Aide-de-Camp to The Queen in succession to Air Commodore F. E. Rosier, C.B.E., D.S.O., who relinquishes the appointment on promotion (9th June, 1959); Air Commodore W. P. Stamm, M.B., B.S., F.R.C.P., M.R.C.S., D.C.P., D.T.M. & H., is appointed Honorary Surgeon to The Queen in succession to Air Vice-Marshal J. C. Neely, C.B., C.B.E., D.M., M.A., B.Ch., F.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.O.M.S., D.O. (Oxon.), on the latter's retirement from the R.A.F. (2nd April, 1959); The Reverend T. Hankin, B.A., is appointed Honorary Chaplain to The Queen in succession to the Reverend G. W. N. Groves, O.B.E., A.L.C.D., on the latter's retirement from the R.A.F. (15th April, 1959).

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following were included in The Queen's Birthday Honours List :—

K.C.B.—Acting Air Marshal Walter Graemes Cheshire, C.B., C.B.E.; Acting Air Marshal Kenneth Brian Boyd Cross, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C.

C.B.—The Venerable Francis William Cocks, M.A., Q.H.C.; Air Vice-Marshal G. A. Walker, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., M.A.; Air Commodore G. C. Bladon, C.B.E.; Air Commodore H. Ford, C.B.E., A.F.C.; Air Commodore C. E. S. Lockett; Air Commodore C. J. Salmon, O.B.E.; Air Commodore J. E. R. Sowman, C.B.E.; Air Commodore R. B. Thomson, D.S.O., D.F.C.; Acting Air Commodore P. G. Jameson, D.S.O., D.F.C.; Group Captain A. H. Humphrey, O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C.

G.B.E.—Air Chief Marshal Sir Claude Bernard Raymond Pelly, K.C.B., C.B.E., M.C., A.D.C.

K.B.E.—Air Vice-Marshal Leslie Dalton-Morris, C.B., C.B.E.; Air Vice-Marshal Francis Wilfrid Peter Dixon, C.B.E., M.B., B.S., F.R.C.S., F.R.C.S.(Edin.), D.O.(Oxon.), Q.H.S.

APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Marshal Sir John R. Whitley, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., to be Inspector-General of the R.A.F. (3rd June, 1959); Air Marshal Sir Richard L. R. Atcherley, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C. (Retired), to succeed Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders, G.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., M.M. (Retired), as Chief Co-ordinator of the Anglo-American Community Relations Scheme in the United Kingdom; Group Officer Alice Lowery, R.R.C., is appointed Matron-in-Chief, P.M.R.A.F.N.S., with the rank of Air Commandant (1st September, 1959); Mr. M. B. Morgan, C.B., M.A., F.R.Ae.S., to be Scientific Adviser to the Air Ministry.

BOMBER COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal T. A. B. Parselle, C.B.E., to be Senior Air Staff Officer (8th May, 1959); Air Vice-Marshal J. G. Davis, C.B., O.B.E., to be A.O.C. No. 1 Group (14th June, 1959).

COASTAL COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal L. W. C. Bower, C.B., D.S.O., D.F.C., to be A.O.C. No. 19 Group (1st May, 1959).

PROMOTIONS

The following half-yearly promotions are dated from 1st July, 1959 :—

General Duties Branch

Air Vice-Marshal to Air Marshal.—Sir Denis H. F. Barnett, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., M.A. (Acting Air Marshal); Sir Edward Chilton, K.B.E., C.B. (Acting Air Marshal).

Air Commodore to Air Vice-Marshal.—D. R. Evans, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal) (seniority 1st January, 1958); C. T. Weir, C.B.E., D.F.C. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); P. H. Dunn, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal); F. S. Stapleton, D.S.O., D.F.C., B.A. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal).

Group Captain to Air Commodore.—S. W. B. Menaul, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C. (Acting Air Commodore); J. M. Thompson, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C. (Acting Air Commodore); R. J. P. Prichard, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C.; F. M. Milligan, O.B.E., A.F.C. (Acting Air Commodore); E. G. Jones, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C. (Acting Air Commodore); H. I. Edwards, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., D.F.C. (Acting Air Commodore); C. D. Tomalin, O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C.; G. T. B. Clayton, D.F.C.

Wing Commander to Group Captain.—D. T. Witt, D.S.O., D.F.C., D.F.M.; R. Berry, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.F.C.; D. Iveson, D.S.O., D.F.C.; R. F. Harman, D.F.C., A.F.C.; J. O. Barnard, O.B.E.; A. L. Winskill, D.F.C.; C. A. Alldis, D.F.C., A.F.C., M.A.; D. B. Fitzpatrick, O.B.E., A.F.C.; R. N. H. Courtney, D.F.C., A.F.C.; L. H. Trent, V.C., D.F.C.; D. F. Hyland-Smith, M.V.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.; J. N. Stacey, D.S.O., D.F.C.; R. B. Morison, D.F.C., A.F.C.; W. M. Kenyon, O.B.E., A.F.C.; R. J. Dempsey, D.F.C., A.F.C.; E. James, D.F.C., A.F.C.; D. Crowley-Milling, D.S.O., D.F.C.; E. Plumtree, O.B.E., D.F.C.; F. L. Dodd, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.; H. B. Martin, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.; R. G. Knott, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

Technical Branch

Air Vice-Marshal to Air Marshal.—H. D. Spreckley, C.B., O.B.E., M.I.Mech.E., F.R.Ae.S. (Acting Air Marshal).

Group Captain to Air Commodore.—A. G. Powell, A.M.I.E.E. (Acting Air Commodore); P. H. Holmes, O.B.E. (Acting Air Commodore); H. M. Russell, O.B.E., A.F.R.Ae.S. (Acting Air Commodore); J. K. Rotherham, O.B.E., B.A., D.I.C., A.F.R.Ae.S. (Acting Air Commodore).

Wing Commander to Group Captain.—W. J. Macken, O.B.E.; J. Goodman; L. H. Moulton, D.F.C.; A. S. Knowles, O.B.E., A.F.C., A.F.R.Ae.S.; P. C. Cleaver, O.B.E., A.M.I.Mech.E., A.F.R.Ae.S., D.C.Ae.; K. B. S. Willder, O.B.E., B.Sc., A.M.I.E.E.

Equipment Branch

Air Commodore to Air Vice-Marshal.—R. C. Storrar, C.B., O.B.E. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal).

Group Captain to Air Commodore.—A. H. McM. Hely, O.B.E., A.D.C. (Acting Air Commodore).

Wing Commander to Group Captain.—G. N. Blake, M.B.E.; G. P. S. Thomas, O.B.E.; N. W. Kearon, O.B.E.

Medical Branch

Air Commodore to Air Vice-Marshal.—C. A. Rumball, C.B.E., F.R.C.P., M.R.C.S., D.T.M. & H., D.P.M., L.D.S., Q.H.P. (Acting Air Vice-Marshal).

Group Captain to Air Commodore.—E. A. Rice, O.B.E., M.B., B.Ch.

Wing Commander to Group Captain.—W. B. Thorburn, M.B., Ch.B., D.P.H., D.I.H.; R. J. A. Morris, M.B., Ch.B., D.P.H.; A. J. Barwood, O.B.E., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.P.H.

Education Branch

Wing Commander to Group Captain.—A. A. McGregor, B.Sc.

RETIREMENTS

Air Marshal Sir Richard Atcherley, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C. (4th April, 1959); Air Marshal Sir Douglas Macfadyen, K.C.B., C.B.E. (29th April, 1959); Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Gillmore, C.B., C.B.E. (29th April, 1959); Air Commodore C. E. S. Lockett (10th May, 1959); Air Vice-Marshal H. V. Satterly, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C. (29th April, 1959); Air Commodore R. C. Field (29th April, 1959); Air Commodore E. J. Corbally, C.B.E., retaining the rank of Air Vice-Marshal (29th April, 1959); Air Vice-Marshal J. C. Neely, C.B., C.B.E., D.M., M.A., B.Ch., D.O.(Oxon.), F.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.O.M.S., Q.H.S. (30th April, 1959); Air Vice-Marshal C. G. Lott, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C. (29th May, 1959); Air Commodore J. H. T. Simpson, D.S.O., A.F.C. (1st June, 1959); Air Vice-Marshal J. N. T. Stephenson, C.B., C.B.E. (29th May, 1959); Air Marshal Sir Andrew McKee, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C. (13th June, 1959); Air Commodore N. A. Tait, O.B.E., A.F.R.Ae.S. (20th June, 1959).

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

War and the Soviet Union. By H. S. Dinerstein. (*Praeger, N.Y., Stevens and Sons, London.*) 37s. 6d.

Here is an assessment of Soviet strategic thinking over the last decade which must create a certain disquiet in respect of current Western strategy. Mr. Dinerstein's thesis is briefly an attempt to demonstrate the gradual growth of Soviet thinking from the traditional purely defensive posture to what has become a distinctly aggressive one. At the heart of this aggressiveness, and possibly because of it, it seems that the Soviets entertain the possibility of a pre-emptive blow.

This must be one occasion where it is not necessary to apologise for dealing with the conclusion of a book first. There does not seem any reason to doubt that the pre-emptive blow idea has very considerable currency in the U.S.S.R. at the present time. What is interesting is that the logic of the pre-emptive blow lays its compulsion on strategy for the West. Must we ourselves now adopt a strategy of the pre-emptive blow? At no point does Mr. Dinerstein suggest that such a course is likely or desirable, but it is implicit in the whole tenor of his research. The implications for Western strategy of such a conclusion are very great indeed, because the role of the pre-emptive blow is in reality that of an aggressor which is alien to the character of the Western attitude.

Under the blight of Stalin's rule, strategic thinking in Russia appears to have been singularly uninspired. With Stalin's demise, however, and the subsequent relaxation, military comment became, if not original, then decidedly more positive. The politicians' use of war-talk as an antidote to domestic and internal difficulties is only less confusing than the reluctance to talk war when the danger seemed most imminent.

The author traces with considerable skill the development of Russian strategic thinking from the defensive-offensive attitude and a complete reliance on Stalin's 'permanently operating factors.' Over the years and through the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has moved through a series of what must be, to her leaders, striking innovations. There was the growing indoctrination and the development in weapons and their use, and the gradual acceptance of surprise as more than of secondary importance. It is not surprising therefore that the lapse of the defensive-offence policy should lead straight to the strategy of the pre-emptive blow.

There is, finally, what appears to Mr. Dinerstein a somewhat conclusive circumstance; the stepping-up of Russia's air and civil defences for their home front. No major power, he considers, would in this nuclear age hope to provide an adequate air or civil defence for the people and industrial potential; and he thinks these provisions are made against retaliatory measures of an enemy who has been caught on the wrong foot by a pre-emptive blow. Such provisions, he feels, are the signs of potential aggression rather than those of defensive prudence.

War and the Soviet Union is a very useful survey and introduces many worthwhile distinctions, particularly in Chapters 2, 3, and 6. The tendency to dogmatize or mix political doctrine with strategic premises makes the Russian leaders appear altogether too naive. It is difficult to believe that there are not some in influential positions who think more rapidly and positively about strategy than is demonstrated here. It must surely be unwise to suppose that ideologically the Russians are rendered blind, deaf, and dumb to all other considerations outside the Party Line. It is true that the Marxist interpretation of history may provide these men with much of their motivation, yet democratic society is also materialistic and may provide our own leaders with as many diverse and perhaps erroneous assumptions about politics in general and strategy in particular.

The final chapter—The Conduct of Nuclear War—is the most interesting and revealing. It is revealing in that it indicates the Russian attitude to the possible use of

nuclear weapons and how they might behave in a nuclear conflict. It is interesting insofar as it points the moral for the West: how will we behave if a pre-emptive blow is struck and the Russians occupy Europe? Not the least useful section of this chapter deals with the respective roles of the Russian Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Any reservations on research of this kind must centre round the nature of the material used. It is drawn from Russian military and civil publications and may to some extent be 'plugs' or 'hand-outs.' There is no accurate way of assessing how far they reflect what these military and political leaders thought as well as said at that time. What is quite convincing about this survey is the manifest change in Soviet thinking. That could not be created by judicious selection or editing of the excerpts. The problems that the book posits for Western minds are also quite unequivocal.

The guiding principle in Soviet military affairs today appears to be a readiness to engage in any sort of war in the most effective manner. There is greater assurance and so much less apprehension among Soviet leadership regarding the likelihood of war, or the kind of war which may break out, and the possible consequences. Surely these factors themselves should be sufficient to regenerate the essential dynamism of N.A.T.O. and lead to a reappraisal of the situation in areas outside Europe.

Mr. Dinerstein has provided us with a most useful handbook to the Russian strategic mind, for which we cannot be too grateful since it must inevitably stimulate our own thinking on strategy.

Orde Wingate. By Christopher Sykes. (*Collins.*) 35s.

Not in the Limelight. By Sir Ronald Wingate. (*Hutchinson.*) 25s.

Much has been written about the first of these books, published last April, and many will have read it, both those who knew Wingate and those who did not. It may well be that Wingate's reputation will thrive and develop with those who knew him best, but with those who have to rely on the written word his title to fame may become as questionable as that of the late T. E. Lawrence. Those who knew him well will welcome a brilliant and faithful biography, as detailed to his faults as to his virtues. Others may question the sometimes inadequate sources and will wonder at the omission of certain incidents in the Palestine period and, in Burma, the refusal to admit the evidence of Field-Marshal Sir William Slim in *Defeat into Victory*.

What is genius? The author writes: "He was unquestionably a man of genius, using that term in its original and stricter sense. There was in him an inner and active impulse which gave him continual energy with a sense of obeying unseen powers, a driving force such as the ancient idea of the attendant daemon well describes. . . ." And he adds: "It is to the great credit of the Army that despite Wingate's aversion to all its cherished ways, he advanced far in its service, but his progress could at no stage have been other than grievously painful."

The reader will at the end have to determine whether his unseen driving force led to achievements of such merit as to earn the label of genius in its modern sense and of such importance as to outweigh the appalling handicaps and penalties with which Wingate loaded himself and, it must be said, was apt to visit on others. Christopher Sykes has produced a great book on a man who will ever both attract and repel.

Orde Wingate's cousin, Ronald, son of the Sirdar, needed no daemon to drive him. He delighted in a life which he describes with verve and taste, taking us through a career of an Indian 'Political'—so many of whom seem to possess inspired pens—and through subsequent adventures in the second World War which kindle envious yearnings. There is material here for half-a-dozen books. More please, Sir Ronald.

The Nine Days of Dunkirk. By David Divine. (*Faber and Faber.*) 21s.

Addressing the House of Commons in the week after Dunkirk Mr. Winston Churchill concluded with the words, "Wars are not won by evacuations." But evacuation is an

exercise in the application of sea power and Dunkirk enabled the hard core of the British Army to retreat to England there to build up the foundations for eventual victory. There is, therefore, much truth in the author's statement that "the invasion of Normandy was made possible in the nine days of Dunkirk." It is in this light that Mr. Divine, who himself took part in the operation, sets out to give a factual account of the evacuation and the land battles which preceded and accompanied it. His material is drawn from a variety of sources, including interviews with many who took a leading part in the campaign together with unpublished diaries, letters, signals, orders, and private papers.

In particular he sets out to expose some of the popular conceptions which have gained currency regarding the campaign; that the evacuation was made possible by the unco-ordinated efforts of the little ships; that Hitler's order stopping the panzer divisions on the line of the Aa Canal saved the B.E.F.; that the British Army deserted the French; and that King Leopold betrayed the British.

The success of the whole operation depended primarily on two men, Lord Gort who commanded the B.E.F., and Bertram Ramsay, Vice-Admiral Dover. In his appreciation of the part played by Gort the author stoutly defends the C.-in-C., B.E.F., against all adverse criticism and hotly disputes certain passages in Sir Arthur Bryant's *The Turn of the Tide* which, Divine claims, have created the impression that it was Brooke's and not Gort's action which saved the left flank of the B.E.F. following the Belgian capitulation. A true appreciation of Lord Gort's generalship is overdue, and Mr. Divine is to be congratulated on providing it, even at the expense of some over-emphasis.

His account of the day-to-day handling of the miscellaneous fleet of some 1,000 vessels is admirably compiled and dramatically supported by numerous first-hand

DAVID DIVINE'S The Nine Days of Dunkirk

"The standard account of a tremendous event, accurate and precise, yet more exciting to read than any thriller."—YORKSHIRE POST. "It should be read by everyone who does not know or has forgotten the story of the nine days which cover the last stage of the Army's fighting withdrawal and the Navy's unprecedented achievement in evacuating every British soldier (and about 140,000 of the French) who reached the coast near Dunkirk."—MAJOR L. F. ELLIS, DAILY TELEGRAPH. "Excellent. . . . He has the gift of presenting the complex strategical problems of this crisis in our history with great dash."—THE OBSERVER. 21s.

The Failure of Atomic Strategy

and a new proposal for the Defence of
the West

F. O. MIKSCHÉ

"Military writers are much exposed to the occupational hazard of being proved wrong by events. Colonel Miksche enjoys the distinction of having been proved right by them. . . . His new book is a detailed and closely reasoned criticism of N.A.T.O. policy and of Western strategy in general. . . . Where Colonel Miksche differs from most analysts is in the force and eloquence with which his arguments are marshalled and the impressive array of facts by which they are supported."—SUNDAY TIMES 25s.

Faber & Faber

accounts from those who manned them. It is pleasing to note that he gives due recognition to those French, Polish, Belgian, and Dutch seamen who served alongside their British allies and places in its proper perspective the gallant and invaluable part played by the little ships in support of destroyers, minesweepers, and channel ferries which carried the bulk of the troops.

The part played by the R.A.F. in covering the evacuation is less satisfactorily handled. At least one reader is left with the feeling that too little emphasis is placed on the difficulties with which the Air Ministry was faced in providing fighter cover over Dunkirk from home bases and in view of the need to conserve fighter resources for home defence. The author appears to hold the view that by employing all our resources over Dunkirk we might have ensured the destruction of the enemy's air force and thereby, presumably, anticipated the Battle of Britain.

This is a most valuable, stimulating and readable record of one of the key battles in our history.

NAVAL

Fear God and Dread Nought. Volume III. The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. Edited by Arthur J. Marder. (*Jonathan Cape.*) 50s.

The interest in Lord Fisher's letters roused in the preceding volumes is increased in this final volume with the dramatic background of war. Professor Marder writes: "Fisher returned . . . as the saviour of Britain, the elect of the nation, to take over the management of the weapon he had forged." Among others, Admiral Beatty approved. He wrote: "He will rule the Admiralty and Winston with a heavy hand and please God we shall change our present methods for a strong offensive policy." He was wrong in one respect; as we shall see.

Readers in any walk of life cannot help being absorbed in this book. It shows a crowded stage, the principal actors being 'Jacky' Fisher and Winston Churchill, the First Lord. Around them they gathered men of all sorts well known in their day, some of lasting fame, some now forgotten. And we see Britain, after a century troubled by no major war, painfully rediscovering the old principles of war and wondering how technical developments would fit into them. In one of his letters Fisher wrote: "The way the war is conducted both ashore and afloat is chaotic. We have a new plan every week."

Fisher had for many years been foremost in the Navy in embodying new mechanical and scientific devices, notably to do with big guns, speed, oil fuel, and submarines. But constant study on the material side did not blur his strategic vision. To him maritime strategy had not changed. The Empire's sea communications had to be directly protected but, so long as Germany maintained a fleet in being, we had always to have on the spot a fleet able to crush it. Nelson's "only numbers can annihilate" held good. Fisher, deeply conscious of this truism, was critical of the ever increasing calls on the Grand Fleet to meet demands from the Dardanelles. Hence, as the First Lord was bent on success there—in itself a fine strategic conception—friction mounted steadily. Sad, as there had been mutual admiration and friendship, but inevitable; for had it not been Gallipoli it would have been somewhere else. Both these imperious men wanted to rule absolutely. The direction of war at the Admiralty was sadly affected; the First Lord frequently sending out directions on operations without the full knowledge of the First Sea Lord. On one such occasion the other Sea Lords put on paper their strong objection to this procedure, a most unusual step. Fisher, on his side, might have exercised greater tact. The situation at last became impossible and Fisher, in May, 1915, resigned. He was then induced to become chairman of the Board of Invention where he was never happy for he had no direct power—he called it the Chemist Shop.

Wherever he was Fisher wrote an unending stream of letters to his many friends, caustically critical of policy or full of constructive suggestions as to how the war should be fought. To his nearest friends he showed superlative affection. It was always "Beloved Jellicoe" in his many letters to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. He generally found quotations from the Bible to back his arguments. And he had a fund of *obiter dicta* of his own, e.g., "My motto is Never Explain"; "Favouritism is the Secret of Efficiency"; "Rashness in war is Prudence. Prudence in war is Imbecility."

We have to congratulate Professor Marder on the manner in which he has produced this most valuable work. It is a classic indeed.

The Narrow Seas : A History of the English Channel. By Reginald Hargreaves. (Sidgwick and Jackson.) 45s.

Histories, to be clearly understood, must go hand in hand with geography and, in a book such as this, some oceanography. Major Hargreaves with his wide knowledge of sea matters is able to pick out factors, such as tides, currents, winds, anchorages, which in our wars, including the late war, have influenced our strategy. The history of our struggle for the use of the Channel in early days and for our ultimate supremacy there is told in greater detail than is to be found in most books on this subject that come our way; even so the author says, apologetically: "In dealing with over 2,000 eventful years a certain amount of short circuiting has been ineludible." Maybe, but we get all the facts we need to show how our sea power was built up. Among other things we see how the eternal difficulty of extorting money from reluctant kings and people wherewith to provide an adequate Navy, and the various ways in which these difficulties were more or less overcome (they have not been fully surmounted today) are fully described.

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THE TIMES

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Until the end of the Roman occupation, and indeed, long after, the *Brythons* made little attempt to defend the country against constant invasions and raids by intercepting their enemies on the high seas. They merely retaliated by sending their 'navies' to enemy ports and beating them up. But towards the 12th century England realized that adequate defence of her country and trade could only be effected by seeking out and destroying the enemy at sea. From that realization was our sea power born.

The book may be heavy in one sense, extending as it does to over 500 pages, but otherwise not so; for new points of interest constantly arise and their presentation is attractively and often humorously handled. A comprehensive and a fine book.

The French Navy in World War II. By Rear-Admiral Paul Auphan, French Navy (Retd.), and Jacques Mordal. (*U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis.*) \$6.00.

"Obedience of the military to the civil authority is, as a matter of fact, the rule in all navies. That rule was respected in France as in England." This extract from the book under review gives the key to the tragic history of the French Navy in the second World War. After the fall of France the majority of the naval personnel remained loyal to the Vichy regime of Marshal Petain, and to Darlan, the political admiral who wielded undisputed power not only in the Navy but also for a long period in other fields of government. It is a cardinal argument of the authors that this loyalty enabled France—at least until November, 1942—to barter the neutralization of her fleet for the continuance of a viable country, an established government, and an intact empire overseas.

Yet this policy also led to the painful episodes at Oran and Dakar, the British seizure of French warships and their crews at Portsmouth and Plymouth (which greatly hurt French pride), and countless other conflicts in Indochina, Madagascar, Djibouti, Martinique, the French Cameroons, and Syria. In all these places the French Navy became involved in varying degree, while France reaped no rewards, but only a toll of losses and a legacy of post-war complications, especially in Indochina. In the end France had lost 65 per cent. of her warships and half her merchant fleet.

We can sympathize with the Navy of France, which bore no responsibility for the initial defeat; we can appreciate the perplexities in French North Africa at the time of the Anglo-American landings, when orders and counter-orders from Vichy caused unnecessary bloodshed on both sides. But it is not easy to understand the peculiar duplicity that Darlan was practising at this time in order—as the authors maintain—"to play a waiting game and to seize the opportunity, when it presented itself, for active re-entry into the war on the side of the Allies."

The book also presents a fair picture of the problems and achievements of de Gaulle's Free French Navy and of the reasons underlying the British and American attitudes towards Vichy. More weight could have been given to the fact that, from bitter experience, the British could never trust Hitler's word (as expressed in Article 8 of the Armistice terms) that the French Fleet would remain unmolested. Indeed, that word was broken when on 27th November, 1942, German armoured units seized the Toulon base, and the French, true to their pledge, hurriedly scuttled 77 large and small warships.

In a brief introduction the American Admiral H. K. Hewitt admirably sums up the counter-arguments to the French point of view. As for the authors, Admiral Auphan's long association with Darlan lends authority to his writing, while Jacques Mordal is already well known for several excellent naval books. Their tolerance towards the many conflicting views and interests and their sparse but shrewd comments result in a work of undoubted historical merit.

British Warship Names. By Captain T. D. Manning and Commander C. F. Walker. (*Putnam.*) 42s.

What's in a name? In fact, to the officer or man who serves in her, a warship's name means as much as the regiment's to a soldier. To the public it may recall a battle

won (*Victory, Lion, Ajax*). And to the poet it may bring inspiration ("And the little *Revenge* ran on"; "*Unity, Claribel, Assyrian, Stormcock, and Golden Gain*").

For more reasons than these the choice of suitable names for warships is, therefore, important. The surprising thing is that not until as late as 1940 did the Board of Admiralty establish a standing committee to advise them in the matter. The 1914 committee on destroyer names and Vice-Admiral Hopwood's 1926 committee were short lived. But the Admiralty Ships' Names Committee, established to relieve the Controller of the task of selecting names for the multitude of vessels added to the Navy in the second World War, remains in being. The authors of this book suggested it and served on it. There could be none better qualified to compile an up-to-date, comprehensive dictionary of British warship names, to which the late First Sea Lord has fittingly supplied a foreword, since it is just 50 years since his father completed his *Men-of-War Names*.

The greater part of this new work is a dictionary, confined for reasons of space to ships of corvette size and larger. Each name is given its meaning or derivation, followed by a succinct list of the ships that have borne it, their type, date of launching or acquisition, and the date and manner of their disposal, with occasionally other facts of special interest. Battle honours are also given but, for some unexplained reason, these are not always in agreement with those which since the second World War have been officially bestowed by the Admiralty and are now printed in the *Navy List*.

The dictionary is preceded by half-a-dozen chapters, all too brief because of their interest, first outlining the evolution of the different type names for warships (cruiser, frigate, etc.), then showing how individual ship names were for so long subject to no system but only to the fashion of the age—religious in the reign of Henry V (*Jesus, Grace Dieu*), royal in the time of Henry VIII (*Sovereign, Regent*), heroic in the first Elizabethan era (*Victory, Triumph, Defiance*), and so on. Not until the latter part of Victoria's rule did order begin to rise out of haphazard choice when homogeneous series of names were first bestowed on particular classes of ships (the 'Admiral' class of battleships, 'County' class cruisers). The final change to the comparatively well-ordered method of recent years has been quick: that it is not wholly well-ordered is admirably explained in the last introductory chapter which covers the work of the Ships' Names Committee during the last war, explaining some of the many problems with which it had to contend. For assuredly the traps are many; your reviewer recalls serving in a destroyer flotilla whose nine ships included the *Seraph* and the *Serapis*, between which when signalled in morse there is a difference of but a single dot, so that confusion was only avoided by the tedious expedient of invariably coding both names.

Evidently a labour of love, we are in debt to the authors of this book not only for a valuable addition to our reference libraries but one well worth taking from the shelves for the hour needed to read its introductory text.

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AIR

The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. Edited by Asher Lee. (*Weidenfeld and Nicolson.*) 36s.

The efficiency of the Iron Curtain is well maintained and the Soviet's reputation for inaccessibility and good military security is based on solid fact. Nevertheless, as this book shows, a detailed picture of Soviet military strength can be obtained by careful research. The volume is part of a trilogy and most serious students of Soviet military affairs will be familiar with its counterparts which have preceded it in publication. Although the three books are anthologies compiled by different editors, the texts do not overlap and indeed the reader of this one is referred to *The Soviet Army* for intelligence information and to *The Soviet Navy* for development of naval air forces.

The early chapters deal with the development of Soviet military power before the second World War (1917-41). It is particularly interesting to note the debt Russia owes to other countries who have been more casual in parting with technical information. Reference is made, for example, to the ill-starred exportation from the United Kingdom of Rolls Royce Nene turbo-jet engines and Derwents. William Green, who writes on the development of jet fighters and fighter bombers, contends that "had it not been for this unfortunate export, the MIG 15 might never have materialized, at least in the form in which it attained international fame. . . . There can be little doubt that the supply of British turbo-jets to the Soviet Union saved Russia about two years research in her fighter development programme." Similarly Richard Stockwell, who contributes a chapter on "The German Legacy," believes that the Russians would not have achieved their present position as a world power if it had not been for the help, and the loot, received from Germany.

Two chapters are devoted to operations in the second World War, the first covering the period from June, 1941, to Stalingrad is written by General Schwabedissen, an ex-Wehrmacht officer, and the second, covering the period of great Soviet success from early 1943 to the summer of 1945, by Peter Williams, well known as the editor of the *Royal Air Force Flying Review*. These chapters provide a lucid account of periods in which the conditions naturally favoured rapid development of military aircraft and aerial techniques. The book is, however, not completely technical and historical, a particularly interesting section discusses the human side of the post-war Soviet Air Force and much information is provided on the routine daily life of the air and ground crews and on air training and technical education. Politics, of course, are inseparable from the Soviet Air Force, "the Party is the real and absolute ruler of the country and of its armed forces," and training is never free of a degree of political interference, but at least one author, Boris Kuban, a former Soviet Air Force officer, contends that "politics and the secret police are by no means a crippling factor, on the whole they may stimulate the laggard more than they handicap initiative and leadership." He says, "Perhaps airmen as a race are fairly immune to politics of all kinds"—which is a piquant thought.

The main part of the book covers the development and present state of Soviet military air power; in the final analysis this must depend on the modern weapons the Soviet can produce and how effectively she can operate them. In this study separate chapters are devoted to Soviet aircraft and rocket production, long range attack, strategic air defence, and finally future developments. Consideration is also given to the potential force of the Soviet Union's allies and to the progress made since the second World War in civil aviation, which is described as "little short of phenomenal." In all there is a wealth of information on modern Russian military aviation which goes far to explain the development and the apparent paradoxes of current policy. Russia's military system, like its society, embodies at one and the same time the most advanced and the most backward and it is possible to take more than one view of any situation. Indeed, in the U.S.S.R. there are so many facets that, as the old maxim puts it, "everything one says about Russia is true."

No one who takes up this reasonable and realistic book can fail to finish it without a profound respect for Soviet ability and resource but it is reassuring to note that the editor, who has great experience in the Intelligence field, finishes on an optimistic note. Commenting that global war is no longer a continuation of policy but "the creation of haphazard chaotic circumstances over which neither side can exercise political control," he maintains that sound Marxists probably believe that they have built up their armed forces to the pitch where they need not fear attack from the West and they can now rely on victory through social and economic pressures. As they believe that they have a "superior and more flexible economic system than the capitalistic West," they are therefore confident of victory and "their proposals for eventual disarmament may well be genuine." It is up to the Communists to prove that Asher Lee's optimism is well founded; in the meantime we can make good use of this book to study Soviet military potential.

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(*Books for Reference in the Library only.)

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- WAR AND THE SOVIET UNION. By H. S. Dinerstein. (Praeger, N.Y., Atlantic Books, Stevens & Sons, London, 1959.) 37s. 6d. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME. By F. Sternberg. (Atlantic Books, Stevens & Sons, 1959.) 35s. Presented by the publishers.
- ARMS AND THE STATE. By Walter Millis. (The Twentieth Century Fund, N.Y., 1959.) \$4.
- THE FAILURE OF ATOMIC STRATEGY. By F. O. Miksche. (Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1959.) 25s. Presented by the publishers.
- THE LOGIC OF DEFENCE. By Patrick Lort-Phillips. (Radical Publications, 1959.) 4s. 6d.

BIOGRAPHY AND MEMOIRS

- FEAR GOD AND DREAD NOUGHT. Vol. III. Edited by Arthur J. Marder. (Jonathan Cape, 1959.) 50s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- ORDE WINGATE. By Christopher Sykes. (Collins, 1959.) 35s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- NOT IN THE LIMELIGHT. By Sir Ronald Wingate. (Hutchinson.) 25s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
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- NAVAL LEADERSHIP. Produced by the U.S. Naval Academy. (U.S. Naval Institute, 1959.) \$3.
- BRITISH WARSHIP NAMES. By Captain T. D. Manning and Commander C. F. Walker. (Putnam, 1959.) 42s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)

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- THE IMPACT OF AIR POWER. By Eugene M. Emme. (Van Nostrand, 1959.) 78s. Presented by the publishers.
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- THE SOVIET AIR AND ROCKET FORCES. Edited by Asher Lee. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959.) 36s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- SPACE WEAPONS. Edited by the editors of *Air Force Magazine*. (Thames and Hudson, 1959.) 30s.

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WELLINGTONIAN STUDIES. EDITED BY Michael Howard. Presented by the Governors of Wellington College.

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ceedings, May, 1959.
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